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ABSTRACT
Solely equating terrorism with criminality discounts the social, political, cultural, and historical
motivations that drive people to employ violence as a strategy for collective action. Using the
multi-institutional politics approach to social movements (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008), this
study explores the choice of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines to employ terror and
violence as the primary social movement tactic to pursue their Islamic separatist cause.
Analysis of archival and open-source data, together with original interviews, reveal that the
problem is multi-institutional – developmental, cultural, historical, social and political all at the
same time. The choice of violence results from a distinctive combination of context-specific
conditions rather than from pure fundamentalist ideology or political opportunities. The culture of
“warlordism,” history of Muslim oppression, weak governance and law enforcement, and the
lack of economic opportunities in the southern Philippines, has largely directed the strategy of
the ASG over time. Specific tactics of kidnap for ransom, extortion, and small-scale (nonsuicide) bombings currently point to a wavering and superficial Islamic fundamentalist
ideological indoctrination among its members and supporters. Strategic choices thus depend on
the struggle for material and symbolic power in Mindanao. This suggests that the tactics of the
ASG arise not from purely political or secessionist motivations, but rather emerge as a
consequence of a multi-layered structure of dominance, and a complex power struggle in
Mindanao. Consequently, a purely militaristic approach to eliminate the ASG that disregards the
multi-institutional nature of the problem will simply be a cause of perennial frustration.
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Terror as a Social Movement Tactic:
Applying the Multi-Institutional Politics Approach
to the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group
PART I.
THE STUDY
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
The Social Problem and the Research Question
Political pundits, the media, and scholars alike often portray individuals or groups that
engage in terrorism1 as either hardened criminals or rogue entities. Most of the research in
criminology and sociology suggests an explanatory model of deviance to analyze the dynamics
of the phenomenon. However, describing terrorist acts as merely criminal acts can produce
serious limitations to understanding movements that choose to engage in terrorist activity as a
strategy to further their cause. Solely equating terrorism with criminality – i.e., deviant behavior
that violates formal laws – discounts the social, political, cultural, and historical motivations that
drive people to employ violence as a strategy for collective action. Recent literature in the
discipline argues for the significance of using other theories, particularly those within a social
movement framework, to effectively explain why certain groups that engage in ʻcontentious
politicsʼ choose to employ terror instead of non-violence as a movement tactic (Leheny 2005;
Beck 2008; Goodwin 2012)2.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

There is no universally agreed upon and legally binding definition of terrorism. Scholars and policy makers alike have sought to
formulate the concept with no consensus. Each country has its own interpretation of the phenomenon within its penal code. The United
Nations has twelve conventions on terrorist acts (covering, inter alia, offenses on aircrafts, threats to civil aviation, nuclear terrorism,
terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism), none of which have a clear definition of terrorism per se. Since 2000, the UN has
been working on a proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which would criminalize all forms of international
terrorism. However, the negotiations have been deadlocked due to failure to come to a consensus over the definition of terrorism. The
last round of negotiations from 11-15 April 2011 similarly had no success. Hoffman (2004) provides a helpful list of characteristics that
have been common to most definitions in the field. Terrorism 1) contemplates political aims and motives; 2) entails violence or threats of
violence; 3) is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; and 4) is conducted by
an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying
insignia); and 5) is perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity. As this paper focuses on non-state or oppositional terrorism,
the definition set forth by Goodwin (2006) is that which I shall use to operationalize the concept of terrorism in this paper: Terrorism is
the strategic use of violence and threats of violence by an oppositional political group against civilians or noncombatants,
and is usually intended to influence several audiences.
2
The notion of contentious politics – a tool or technique to make a political point or resist oppression – in social movement scholarship is
currently and actively being reframed to include political violence and terrorism (as well as non-violence) in its conceptualization. The
most recent evidence of this upsurge in interest regarding the use of this theoretical and analytical framework within social movement
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In this paper, I apply the multi-institutional politics approach to analyze social
movements proposed by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) to ask: What drives a particular
political movement to choose violent tactics over a peaceful strategy to further its cause?
What are the conditions that determine and perpetuate the specific types of violent
tactics that the movement employs? What does this tell us about terrorist movements
and the tactics that these groups design and use?
I posit that the use of a social movements lens can indeed help us explore these
questions and understand – in ways that a deviance or criminological lens cannot – why certain
collective action groups carry out terrorist acts as their primary tactic. This study will consider
these questions by turning to Southeast Asia – a region acknowledged as a haven of terrorism.
There, we find a social movement organization (SMO) in the Philippines particularly notorious for
employing terror tactics since its inception as an Islamic separatist group in the early 1990s – the
Abu Saayyf Group (ASG). Focusing on this particular SMO that engages in terrorism will be my
starting point for this exploration.
Following the foundational questions of this study and turning to the case of the ASG, I
thus ask: Why has the Abu Sayyaf Group continually and effectively engaged in political
violence and terrorist activity despite long-running and escalating militaristic strategies
directly aimed to quell their activities? Proceeding from this primary question, this study will
further ask: What are the motivations of the ASG in choosing to employ terror? What
institutions and conditions (social, economic, political, cultural and/or historical) have led
the group to choose such tactics, and have allowed these tactics to endure?
Examining the ASG as a social movement organization – instead of as a tightly knit
militaristic organization engaged in an all-out unconventional war against the Philippine state – I

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
literature is the publication of a special issue on political violence, terrorism and social movements by the journal Mobilization (the
international quarterly review of social movement research) in March 2012.
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suggest that (1) the ASG engages in political violence and terrorism not solely to challenge and
overthrow the state (and institute their own), but more significantly to strategically challenge the
dominant socio-economic, political and meaning/cultural systems of power in the Philippines; (2)
the tactics employed by the ASG have been shaped by the unique and context-specific cultural,
historical, political and social conditions that the group exists and operates in; and (3) these
unique mélange of conditions that drive the ASGʼs actions have been made invisible by viewing
the group as a tightly-knit group of bandits; something other than a social movement whose
actions can be viewed as product of the social, economic, political and cultural landscape in
which they operate, leading to failed military efforts to placate the group.
I posit that the nature of the problem is multi-institutional – developmental, cultural,
historical, social and political all at the same time. Using violence is a result of an almost
unconscious combination of context-specific conditions that are completely different from
environments in which other Islamic extremist groups find themselves. Strategies are dependent
on the struggle for material and symbolic power at the systemic level, and the presence or
absence of an ideologue-leader together with the membersʼ desire to attain socio-economic
survival – and then dominance – at the group level. This implies that a purely militaristic
approach that aims to completely eliminate them will simply be a cause of perennial frustration;
for as long as the multi-layered power structures and dynamics in Mindanao – and the rest of the
Philippines for that matter – continue as they are, then the ASG will continue to use terror tactics
to challenge the status quo.
Significance of the Study
The goal of the inquiry at hand is to examine a particular terrorist movement through a
multi-institutional politics approach to social movements to achieve a more nuanced view of the
ASG – a view that will be useful in understanding first, the dynamics of the group; second, the
motivations and conditions surrounding the use of violence and terror as a social movement
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tactic; and lastly, how these violent strategies may be contained based on the conditions
surrounding their use. It will thus seek to identify certain general conditions or contexts within
which the radical movement operates that may have significant bearing on the tactical decisionmaking processes of terrorist movements. This analysis could then produce new insights on how
certain movements choose terror over non-violence and how the anti-terrorism strategy does (or
does not) become useful for groups that engage in violent collective action. Perhaps this study
could also propel similar sociological studies of terrorist groups to increase our understanding of
terrorism as a social movement phenomenon.
Resolving these research questions is not only essential for Southeast Asia but more so
for the Philippines, which has – in the past forty years alone – experienced the most tragedies in
the region as a result of terrorist attacks, not a few of which have been perpetrated by the ASG3.
The misconception of the dynamics of the ASG leads to a mismatch between the response of the
government and the ASGʼs nature, struggle, and demands as a social movement organization. A
more nuanced understanding based on an alternative social movement approach to the issue
could contribute to conciliating this protracted conflict in the southern Philippines.
In order to explore the questions posed above and provide a solid departure point to
analyze the ASG, it is necessary at this point to review the links made in the literature between
social movements, political violence, and terrorism, as well as the existing theoretical and
conceptual scholarship on social movements.

3

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Data from the Global Terrorism Database show that the Philippines has recorded the highest number of attacks in the region at 3,192
incidents of terrorism from 1970 (first year covered by the database) to 2010. Thailand comes in second with 1,697 incidents,
Indonesia with 488 incidents and Malaysia with 45 incidents for the same time period. Important to note however, is that majority of
incidents in Thailand are perpetrated by non-Islamic groups or unknown perpetrators.
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Social Movements, Political Violence and Terrorism

Within political sociology and social movements scholarship, the state is arguably
referred to as the dominant institution that shapes social structures and determines the flow of
power within and among different areas of society. This notion stemming from state theories in
political sociology consequently downplays the contribution of non-elites, or the oppressed, and
other non-state institutions in the political process. However, by using social movements as tools,
ordinary people are able to participate in public affairs and politics (Tilly 2004) and effect change.
Social movements have the objective of promoting or resisting change in society or the world
order to which they belong (McAdam and Snow 1997), and this is why they usually – if not
always – occur in relation to fiercely contested social or political issues of the day. It is also
crucial to note that social movements are manifested through various organizations (Zald and
Ash 1966), hence making ʻsocial movement organizationsʼ (SMOs) crucial to any analysis.
McAdam and Snow (1997: xviii) were able to take note of these characteristics and identify
common elements of social movements as found in the literature: 1) collective or joint action; 2)
change-oriented goals; 3) some degree of organization; 4) some degree of temporal continuity;
and 5) some extrainstitutional collective action, or a mixture or extrainstitutional and institutional
activity. One can argue that since violent Islamic separatist groups such as the ASG work as a
collectivity, seek to effect political change, operate through an organization or network, have
been able to maintain its presence in the country despite harsh state and non-state opposition,
and engage in “extrainstitutional” and violent collective action, then the ASG can – and should –
be analyzed as a social movement organization.
Thus, there has been a view within the political sociology and social movements
literature that SMOs – as groups that engage in fundamentally extra-institutional activities to
effect change – often engage in ʻcontentious politics.ʼ This means that they use disruptive
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techniques to resist elite power, challenge policy, or simply make a political point. Contentious
politics involves “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone elseʼs interest, in
which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly 2008). So
how does violence – and more importantly terrorism – figure into social movement scholarship?
Movement scholars have constantly examined the tactics of social movement
organizations with the belief that tactics influence policy responsiveness on the part of the
movementʼs target audience (Burstein et. al. 1995) and, eventually, achieve the desired social
change. Violence – the use of great physical force to inflict injury to people or damage on
property (della Porta 1995; Graham and Gurr 1969) – has been used tactically to achieve social
change. Thus, while researchers have looked into the effectiveness of non-violent tactics such as
boycotts and sit-ins, Burstein et. al (1995) observe that violence has actually been the most
scrutinized strategy in the field. According to them, most scholars who have examined the choice
of violence by a group suggest that violent tactics are used because they effectively help SMOs
achieve their goals (Gamson 1975; Colby 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977, 1979, cited in Burstein
et. al. 1995). Nevertheless, other research has pointed to the ineffectiveness of violence in that it
may reduce third party-support (Schumaker 1975) or result in a powerful response from the
target (Colby 1985). Still others posit, as observed by Burstein et. al., that violence “has no
independent effect on policy responsiveness” when used by SMOs (Mirowsky and Ross 1981;
Hahn 1970).
While violence is not a new subject of analysis in social movements, it is essential to
note that the violent tactics referred to in the early years of social movement scholarship (as
catalogued by della Porta and Tarrow 1986; and della Porta 1995) do not seem to contemplate
violence as employed by insurgents or terrorist groups. Terrorist violence was largely perceived
as criminal behavior rather than contentious politics, and consequently beyond the ambit of
social movement scholarship. Thus, violence – as studied by movement scholars for decades –
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only pertained to acts like civil disobedience, violent confrontations between groups, riots,
inflicting property damage, trespassing, holdups, hijackings, and clashes with police.
However, the way people have chosen to engage in contentious politics has drastically
transformed in recent history (Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999; Tilly 2008). The tactics they use to
further their cause no longer simply consist of peaceful rallying on the streets on the one hand, or
bloody riots against ranks of police officers on the other. This is because participants in social
movements are political actors, and their behavior and choices while engaging in the movement
have much to do with the movementʼs success (or failure). Political violence is thus one form that
contention may take (Goodwin 2012; Bosi and Guigini 2012); a strategy that a social movement
organization may choose to employ if it will translate to success. However, despite the focus on
ʻviolentʼ tactics early on, radical political violence and terrorism as ʻcontentious politicsʼ – a tool or
technique to make a political point or resist oppression – has been virtually absent from social
movement scholarship (Goodwin 2012). Some have even argued that social movements are not
violent, although they may engage in ʻviolent performancesʼ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007), effectively
pushing out terrorist groups from the domain of social movements. As a consequence, only a
handful of works have studied political violence or terrorism through a social movements lens: a
treatise on the importance of socio-psychological factors and ideology as causes of political
violence (Gurr 1970), an analysis of collective violence in the European perspective (Tilly 1969),
a comparative analysis of movements engaged in political violence in Italy and Germany (della
Porta 1995), and an examination of micromobilization of the Irish Republican Army (White 1989).
Jeff Goodwin (2012) observes that this resistance within the discipline to include political
violence and terrorism as a strategy of social movements seemed to change drastically after the
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Social movement analysts began to wrestle with violence
and terrorism, expanding the literature to include work on violence in civil wars (Kalyvas 2006),
violent Islamic activism (Wicktorowicz 2004), and repression by the government against white
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hate groups (Cunningham 2004). Concepts such as ʻradicalizationʼ (Alimi, Bosi and Demetriou
2012), and leaderless resistance (Deboratz and Waldner 2012) began to be theorized and
comparatively studied within social movements frameworks. At the same time, work on the
strategy of non-violent resistance (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) as contentious
politics has also been on the rise, with studies on how members of a movement choose to
disengage with social movement organizations that decide to carry out violent acts (Horgan
2009; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2012). Contentious politics in social movement scholarship is thus
currently and actively being reframed to include political violence – as well as non-violence – in
its conceptualization4. Moreover, terrorist groups are now coming to be recognized as either local
or transnational SMOs (Leheny 2005). The amplified discussion on violence and non-violence as
social movement tactics, coupled with the recognition of terrorist groups as SMOs, are two
significant steps that provide scholars of terrorism with the much needed impetus to further
knowledge on existing and bourgeoning terrorist organizations, under the ambit of social
movement models.

4

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A relevant collection of current trends in the literature was published as a special issue on political violence and terrorism by the
journal Mobilization (the international quarterly review of social movement research) in March 2012 (Vol. 17, No.1).
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Chapter 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Multi-Institutional Politics Approach vs. Traditional Social Movement Theories

Given the singular character of terrorist movements, is there a more appropriate
theoretical or analytical approach for examining such groups using social movement theories?
As persistent, organized, and collective efforts from below that seek to resist, challenge
or otherwise alter power relationships and policies from the state (Glasberg and Shannon 2010),
I posit that it is most beneficial to examine social movements from the bottom-up, within the
context of multiple institutions. This case study of the ASG will thus use the multi-institutional
politics approach to social movements as proposed by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008).
Their proposed approach mainly challenges the once-dominant political process model,
which assumes that “domination [is] organized by and around one source of power, that political
and economic structures of society [are] primary and determining, and that culture [is] separate
from structure and secondary in importance” (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 74). Instead, they
view domination as “organized around multiple sources of power, each of which is
simultaneously material and symbolic” (emphasis mine, Armstrong and Bernstein 2008:75).
Under this framework, social movements not only challenge the state or political conditions, but
other institutions – including those shaped by history, culture, or socio-economic factors – to
seek policy change, inclusion, cultural change or changes in the rules of the game. Their goals
may be material and symbolic, thus leading to the necessity of a deeper examination of their
grievances by policy makers and scholars alike. Following these assumptions and given the
nature of a social movement under the multi-institutional politics approach, it is then apropos to
ask why the challenges of a particular SMO take the forms that they do. Applied to the case at
hand, the framework allows us a deeper examination of why the ASG chooses to be a violent
terrorist social movement, and what conditions – beyond political opportunities – lead to their
actions.

!
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In seeking to explain the relationship between political phenomena and social structure,
the early study of social movements saw an emphasis on the ʻorientationsʼ of these movements
(Walder 2009) or on what particular conditions facilitated their emergence. The dominant focus in
the literature is on explaining collective action as a result of structural strains such as
ambiguities, deprivations, wars, disasters, and the like, which bring about rapid social change
and disintegration (Smelser 1963; Morrison 1971; Turner and Killian 1972; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly
1975; Marx and Wood 1975). A specific type of strain that many sociologists are drawn toward is
ʻdeprivationʼ: People engage in social movements because they are incited by a lack of what they
need (absolute deprivation) or what they believe they need (relative deprivation). Marx and
Engels (1967) provide the classic argument for absolute deprivation theory in the context of a
capitalist political economy. They posit that the revolution of the proletariat against the
bourgeoisie would inevitably be driven by the immiseration experienced by the former. This
immiseration or absolute deprivation was seen as the cause for the formation of religious groups
or sects (Niebhur 1929) and commitment to religious institutions (Glock 1964).
The explanatory power of absolute deprivation however was challenged by empirical
studies that demonstrated a noticeable lack of correlation between absolute deprivation and the
outbreak of revolutions (Davies, 1969; 1974); hence, some scholars argued that relative
deprivation – oneʼs feeling of discontent over oneʼs situation based on what one wants to have in
comparison with a “reference group” or an expected outcome (Morrison 1971) – was a more
reasonable explanation for social movements. Relative deprivation theory was used to explain
the occurrence of revolutions and rebellions throughout history (Davies 1962, 1969, 1974;
Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier 2001), forms of political violence such as turmoil, conspiracy and
internal/civil war, and the emergence of contention (Gurr 1969, 1970), the relationship of poverty
and movement participation (Pinard 1967), and was also seen as a framework to assess how
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beliefs about social structures are created by the relative deprivation felt by participants
(Morrison 1971).
The limitations of strain theory – and deprivation theory – have become a concern for
some sociologists who observe that social movements do not always emerge despite harsh
conditions experienced by a group; that is, there seems to be no direct relationship between
(material/economic) hardship or deprivation and the rise of social movements (Snyder and Tilly
1972; Oberschall 1973; Jenkins 1983; Mueller 1972; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988).
Looking at the relevance of this for efforts to explain terrorism through economic terms, it has
been shown that there is no correlation between a countryʼs poverty level or level of educational
attainment and its propensity for terrorist activity (Abadie 2004; Krueger and Malekova 2003).
Interesting to note then, is whether non-economic strains – such as cultural or ideological – can
be considered as triggers for terrorist movements, especially those like the ASG that appear to
be based on particular religious or ideological tenets. Nevertheless, such contradictions within
deprivation theory have led to the formulation and propagation of theories that challenge the role
of strains in driving collective action, particularly resource mobilization and political process
models of social movements.
Proponents of resource mobilization argue that social movements or revolutions do not
take place in the absence of “access to critical supportive resources” (Glasberg and Shannon
2010). The emphasis is on the links between movement and institutionalized action, the
rationality of actors, strategic dilemmas confronted by movements, and the role of the movement
in social change (Jenkins 1983). The preeminence of resources (particularly the types and
amounts of resources) in determining not only the emergence of a social movement, but also its
capacity for continued mobilization at various operational levels, has been examined and applied
in various studies including that of local movement organizations (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996),
the rise of the civil rights movement in America (Morris 1984), and even the nature of
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environmental and peace movements as characterized by access to middle class professionals
(McCrea and Markle 1989).
In terrorism policy and scholarship, terrorist recruitment and financing is a major area of
interest, given the popular view that a terrorist group needs to build and maintain a financial
infrastructure like any other criminal organization,5 and that cutting off the funding and manpower
of terrorist groups will serve as a deterrent against their actions6. With the ASG engaging in
kidnap for ransom and extortion activities to obtain most of its financing (Banlaoi 2010) and
reports that it may have received funding from radical Islamic benefactors in the Middle East and
South Asia (Niksch 2002), a resource mobilization approach to analyze ASG operations may
seem beneficial. Nevertheless, focusing on resources may miss the point: Resources – financial
or human – are arguably only a means to an end for movements. What drives the group to
commit violent acts (apart from raking in money) appears to be overlooked under this framework.
A number of scholars agree that resources are still only part of the explanation when
examining movements. For this set of sociologists, political opportunities actually determine their
emergence. Proponents of the political process perspective hold the necessity of having
ʻconditions of conducivenessʼ (McAdam and Snow 1997) for movements. Fundamentally, their
position is that a structure of political opportunities helps explain the variation in movement
behavior throughout history (Lipsky 1970; Eisenger 1973; Meyer and Miknoff 2004), no matter
what issue the movement takes up as its cause. In fact, this structure of political opportunities –
one that would make movements vulnerable to failure or primed for success – has been
examined in cases such as the black insurgency in the U.S. (McAdam 1982), the anti-nuclear

5
6

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 2009. European Union Committee. Available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/132/13204.htm, Accessed on August 7, 2012.
After 9/11, for instance, the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) issued the ʻForty
Recommendations on money launderingʼ and the ʻ9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorism Financing (TF)ʼ. Available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/repository/ guidanceforfinancialinstitutionsindetectingterroristfinancing.html. Accessed on August
5, 2012.
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power

movement

(Meyer

1993;

Joppke

1993),

the

pro-choice/pro-life

movement-

countermovement interaction (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), the womenʼs movement in
America (Constain 1992), and even the juxtaposition of farm workersʼ movements (Jenkins and
Perrow 1977).
The political process model seems to be a fitting tool for studying movements like
terrorist groups, which are primarily motivated by politically related aims. For the ASG, that
ʻpublicizedʼ aim is to establish an Islamic theocracy in the southern Philippines and destabilize
the existing Philippine state. Using the political process model could situate this study within the
historical context of the ASGʼs political struggle vis-à-vis the Philippine state. Yet, given that the
model views power as organized around the state and fails to account for the significance of
other powerful institutions such as the family, cultural or religious institutions, or economic
structures as explanatory factors, the political process model may provide an incomplete analysis
for a uniquely complex case.
Other theories such as framing (Goffman 1974; Gamson et al 1982; Snow and Benford
1988) and the cultural-cognitive approach to social movement analysis (see Beck 2008) have
also found a place in the literature; but political process theory is considered the “hegemonic
paradigm” among social movement analysts (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Nevertheless, the
intricate nature of social movements does not lend itself to interpretation by a universal model
(McAdams and Snow 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Hence, there is increasing support in
the field for more nuanced and inclusive models of analysis, especially those that consider the
impact of culture, shared meanings and non-state institutions of power. McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly (2001), Whitter (2002), Cress and Snow (2000), Armstrong and Bernstein (2008), and Beck
(2008) are some of the more recent scholars who argue for a more integrative theoretical
approach to social movements. They believe in using a theory of social movements that
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recognizes the varying contexts and layers of oppressions, multiple pathways of outcome
attainment for movements, and the multiple sources of power that propel social movements.
Although framing their approaches differently and employing varied concepts (i.e.,
Whitterʼs multi-layered view; Cress and Snowʼs combinatorial and interactive approach;
Armstrong and Bernsteinʼs multi-institutional politics approach; and Beckʼs tripartite approach),
their work indicates a burgeoning crusade for a more multi-faceted and context-based method for
analyzing social movements. While these frameworks may be accused of taking the ʻkitchen sinkʼ
approach, such a multi-faceted phenomenon as social movements – the definition of which is
already being challenged by the emergence of organizations like terrorist groups – needs a
holistic and multidimensional framework to be unpacked.
One other theory (outside the social movements umbrella) that needs some
consideration here is that which has also been used prominently in social science research on
terrorism across various fields – rational choice theory. Rational choice began as a theory in
economics and was eventually adopted by other social scientists in an attempt to combine
theory-guided research with empiricism when exploring social facts (Lindenberg 1992). The
theory is based on the principle that actors are (economically) self-interested and that they act
through a cost-benefit analysis with the goal of maximizing utility. Rational choice analysts can
thus assume that terrorist behavior is foreseeable; that is, people are always motivated by the
wants or goals that express their 'preferences' and they act based on the information they
possess within specific, given constraints (Scott 2000: 127). Moreover, since rational choice uses
strategic mathematical modeling or games (see Coleman 1964; Keiser and Hechter 1998), using
such models to examine and predict terrorist behavior comes across as logical, scientific, and
highly accurate.
Yet, given that we have limited information and intelligence about the interests of terrorist
groups and governments, I would argue that game theoretic models and strategies based on
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cost-benefit analyses

of competing

actors

in

this

context can

only

lead

to more

misunderstandings, which could then only agitate actors – such as the ASG – who may believe
themselves to be perennially misunderstood. The ranking of preferences in any rational choice
model will always be based on the researcherʼs interpretations of meanings and interests.
Moreover, the theory leaves no room for the nuanced influences of culture, ideology, history or
collective action in assessing preferences and interests. Although one can argue that these
factors can be packaged as interests in themselves, the malleable nature of these elements is
lost once when they are boxed into static rational models and quantified. It would be ideal to
systematically and quantitatively explain the behavior of the ASG, but assuming perfect
information about interests of highly dynamic yet covert groups will only bring us further away
from understanding our unit of analysis.
I maintain then that Armstrong and Bernsteinʼs (2008) multi-institutional politics approach
to social movements is the most useful and beneficial tool to study movements as complex as
terrorist groups. Armstrong and Bernsteinʼs approach will go beyond the narrow analysis of
deprivation, the limited analysis of political conditions and state power as demanded by political
process theory, the myopic examination of the conditions that support a groupʼs actions as called
for by resource mobilization theory, and the static models of rational choice to provide a more
comprehensive and multi-faceted analytical lens.
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Chapter 4. DATA and METHODS
This thesis uses the case study as a methodological design frame that necessarily
incorporates various data collection methods (Stake 2005, p.443, cited in Thomas 2011: 512).
The case study as a research method has a twofold technical definition:
[First], a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident…[Second,] the case study
inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result, relies on multiple sources of
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion and, as another
result, benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis (Yin 2009: 18).

This definition emphasizes the all-encompassing nature of the case study as a methodological
frame of inquiry that “covers the logic of design, data collection techniques and specific
approaches to data analysis” (Yin 2009:18) making the case study as a research method more
than just a design or data collection technique (Stoeker 1991). Analytical eclecticism is the key
to how a case study is conducted (Thomas 2011) given that the phenomenon under scrutiny is
complex and unique, and cannot be adequately analyzed using a single data set or a limited
number of variables. It is thus important to note that the case study method is not limited to
being a qualitative study; it can be a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods as called for by
the research question (Yin 2008).
For this study, the case is the ASG and the ʻuniverseʼ is the entire class of violent social
movements in Southeast Asia. The ASG is the subject of the study; that is, its practical and
historical unity. The object of the study – the theoretical, scientific basis for the case – is the
resistance of social movement organizations to dominant social, political and cultural institutions
through violence and terror (George and Bennett, Wieviorka 1992: 159). In order to answer the
research questions about the motivations and conditions behind employing terror tactics and
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political violence using the multi-institutional politics approach, the study engages two main
methods: 1) content analysis and 2) semi-structured interviews.
The content analysis focuses on the examination of publicly available as well as
classified government intelligence documents and/or archival texts on the ASG (obtained with
permission

from

intelligence

authorities),

as

well

as

the

Philippine

governmentʼs

counterterrorism policy over time. Publicly available news reports (newspaper and television) on
ASG activities from its first attack in 1991 to the present, open source file interviews of ASG
members, as well as open source statements (text/audio) from the ASG about their goals and
activities were examined. Previous social science research on the history and operations of the
ASG were also consulted.
Additional data for this study was obtained through interviews conducted with the
following target groups: 1) Philippine government officials working in anti-terrorism agencies; 2)
police and military officials who have formerly worked on or are currently working on the
governmentʼs counterterrorism strategy related to the ASG; 3) journalists who have interacted
with or interviewed members of the ASG; and 4) scholars who have done research on the ASG
and Islamic separatism in the Philippines. Efforts were made to secure interviews with former
members of the ASG who are not detained or involved in any prosecution, but security issues
and government requirements did not allow for the interviews to be securely obtained during the
researcherʼs trip to Manila.7

7
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The initial plan for this study was to interview alleged members of the ASG who are currently detained in two prisons in Metro Manila
– one in Camp Crame, Quezon City and the other in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. The Philippine police attaché assigned to the
Embassy in Washington D.C. had already suggested that a formal letter requesting access to the detainees be sent directly to the
Director of the Philippine National Police in Manila. However, after lengthy discussions with this projectʼs adviser and a consultation
with the Institutional Review Board of the university, I decided not to pursue the interviews with the detainees. Given the nature of
the group and its classification by the U.S. Department of State as a foreign terrorist organization, interviews with detainees
associated with the ASG are fraught with security and legal issues, especially given the surveillance and intelligence laws in the U.S.
that govern information on suspected foreign terrorists. This in itself could compromise the legal rights and safety of the detainee,
especially those in the midst of a criminal investigation or legal proceeding, not to mention the kind and amount of information
revealed during the interview, which could put the detainees in a hazardous legal predicament.
Interviewing current ASG detainees could also raise security issues for involved in the research project in any capacity, as
well as for me. On a practical note, as the prisoner regulations for human subject research would apply in such a case, obtaining
approval for interviews with the said target group would be challenging given the short time frame of the research trip, as well as the
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The interviews were conducted in Manila during a trip to the Philippines from December
17, 2012 to January 18, 2013. The government officials, police and military personnel,
journalists and scholars were identified before the trips to the field. The goal of the interviews
was to collect various perspectives on the motivations of the ASG to employ terror and violence
as tactics, compare and contrast them, and come to conclusions about what actually drives the
ASG to perpetrate violent acts as a political movement. All interviews strictly followed the
guidelines for ethical research involving human subjects, and the rights of all interviewees to
confidentiality and anonymity have been protected from the time they were contacted until the
data from their interviews were transcribed and analyzed. None of the names of the
interviewees are revealed in this study. All names or references used here (except for the
names of known or suspected ASG members as reported) have been changed.
As in all research on terrorism, the main challenge for this study was how to deal with
the limited data available on terrorist groups, and the inability to immediately and safely access
the subjects under study, i.e. the members of the ASG themselves, not to mention being able to
ensure that the interaction with the interviewees in this study remains within the constraints for
protecting human subjects. While first hand data and personal responses from Islamic
fundamentalists in the southern Philippines would ideally and theoretically provide the most
credible information on the motivations behind the tactics of the ASG, interviews with ASG
elements are virtually impossible to arrange and fraught with access, validity, confidentiality and
security issues. There is also the question of reliability of the information obtained from such
prospective interviewees (especially if these interviewees are protecting their identities or
whereabouts), as well as the validity of the information or second-hand data obtained from
interviews with government officials or journalists.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
fact that information (to be included in the IRB application) about the detainees from the government agency responsible for them
would be limited. Such lack of information could compromise the integrity and validity of the interviews, and may even require me to
submit amendments to my protocol while in the field. Given these factors, the costs of pursuing interviews with detainees outweigh
the benefits.
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I am well aware of these data limitations and validity concerns and have done my utmost
to take steps that would not compromise the confidentiality and validity of the interviews, as well
as respect the rights of the interviewee (from whatever target group) to confidentiality and
anonymity. All field work and data collection processes adhered to the proper ethical guidelines
regarding human subject research especially with regard to obtaining consent, setting up a
secure interview location, and ensuring a non-intimidating interview environment (e.g.,
guaranteeing the absence of any proximate influential presence in the interview such as a
government aide or guard when interviewing).
Despite the fact that interviews from former ASG members were not obtained, the heavy
reliance of the study on secondary data analysis (e.g., testimonies from interviewees who had
first-hand interactions with them, ASG statements from existing media interviews with the group)
would not render the study invalid. In fact, using the multi-institutional politics approach to
analyze existing data from archives and open-source reports, supplemented by interviews
collected from Philippine military and police intelligence officers, journalists and scholars, could
provide a nuanced and fresh perspective on the tactical decisions of the ASG.
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PART II.
THE CASE
Chapter 5. THE BACK STORY
History, Politics, Socio-economics of the ʻMoroʼ landscape in the Philippines
HISTORY/IDEOLOGY
If one is to closely analyze the case of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the institutions of
power that shape the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, an understanding of the historical,
geo-political and socio-economic landscape surrounding the struggle of the ʻMorosʼ 8 in the
country is crucial – especially in a predominantly Christian nation.9
The Philippine archipelago is divided into three major island groups: Luzon in the north
(where the capital Manila sits), the Visayas at the center (where one of the most developed
provinces in the country – Cebu – is located), and Mindanao in the south. The Christian majority
has traditionally resided in Luzon and the Visayas with some moving into Mindanao towards the
latter part of the 20th century, while the Muslim minority historically settled in the south.
Figure 1. Map of the Philippines
Note: The area in red is Mindanao.

The arrival of Islam in the Philippines, however, predates the onset of Christianity by
about two to three centuries, with historical records showing Muslim traders landing on Philippine
shores in 1380 as part of the expansion of Islam to Southeast Asia after the Prophet

8
9
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The term ʻMoroʼ is Spanish for ʻMoors,ʼ a reference used by the Spanish colonial authorities for the Muslims in Mindanao (and other
territories), which has been used widely since.
According to the 2010 Philippine Census, 81% are Roman Catholic, 10% belong to other Christian denominations, and only 5% are
Muslim.
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Mohammadʼs death (Caballero-Anthony 2007; Gowing and McAmis 1974; Al-Attas 1969).10 This
makes Islam the oldest recorded monotheistic religion in the country.
The Muslim traders reached the southern Philippines through trade routes from
neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia, settling in Mindanao and first establishing sultanates11 in
1450 AD in the provinces now known as Sulu12 and Maguindanao (Schiavo-Campo and Judd
2005). What is significant here is that Islam brought more than religion to the largely pagan
inhabitants of the islands: The structure of feudal sultanates brought an unprecedented means of
social and political power and control to the entire archipelago. With no other leaders or
communities exerting expansive authority throughout the Philippine islands, Muslim leaders in
the south were able to “exercise varying degrees of control over the other non-Muslim
inhabitants, …conduct trade and military expeditions from Luzon in the north to the Moluccas in
the south, and establish Muslim communities as far north as Manila” (Milligan 2003:470).
What the Spanish colonizers encountered upon the arrival of Ferdinand Magellanʼs fleet
in the island of Leyte in 1521 was thus not a society of unorganized native tribes; rather they
encountered a contender for state power engaged in its own territorial and spiritual expansion
(Majul 1999; McKenna 1998 as cited in Milligan 2003). Spain successfully subjugated the north
and the central islands, converting the natives in those areas to Catholicism. This success,
however, was never achieved in Mindanao (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005; Caballero-Anthony
2007). In the face of the land dispossession and displacement process established by the
Spaniards through the feudal encomienda system, the Muslim sultanates struggled to defend
their own feudal system and control over the tribes that had undergone Islamization since the
10
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After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, which instigated the expansion of Islam to Europe and Africa, it is believed that the wave
spread to Southeast Asia by Muslim traders and missionaries who set out from India and Arabia specifically to convert the nonfaithful; and by war waged against non-Muslim states. See the article by Wadja K. Esmula and Muhiddin Batara Mutia for more
details, available at http://www.islamawareness.net/Asia/Philippines/philippines.html.
11
A sultanate is the dynasty and land in a Muslim state ruled by a sultan, traditionally acquired by hereditary rights
12
The sultanate was founded in the 1400s by Arab explorer and religious scholar Sayyid Abu Bakr Abirin after he settled in Sulu. After
the marriage of Abu Bakr and local dayang-dayang (princess) Paramisuli, he founded the sultanate and assumed the title Paduka
Mahasari Maulana al Sultan Sharif ul-Hāshim.
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14th century (May 1992 cited in Podder 2012). Spain attempted to eradicate Islam by attacking
Sulu and Mindanao (Caballero-Anthony 2007), beginning a period of intermittent wars with the
Moros from 1548 until 1898. In these battles between sultanates and the Spanish conquistadores
however, the Muslims emerged victorious and were able to maintain their rule over the south.
It was not until Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in 1898 that assimilation
of the Muslim south into the central system of governance figured into the countryʼs political
history. While the United States initially sought to protect the Moros from foreign intrusion and
respected the authority of the sultans and Muslim chiefs, the group was recognized as a minority
to be included in national life (Amoroso 2004 cited in Banlaoi 2010). A ʻpolicy of integrationʼ was
adopted by America, which, in principle, recognized the traditional power and influence of datus
(sultans). Nevertheless, instead of allowing them to autonomously rule over their territories, the
datus were incorporated into the central governance system by being elected into political offices
as provincial governors, senators and congressmen (Podder 2012). The goal was to have the
Muslim populations represented in the colonial government. The process gave rise to “MuslimFilipinos” – a new generation of Muslim leaders “who accepted that Mindanao was inextricably
linked to the larger political framework centered in Manila” (Abinales 2000). However, such
integration was perceived by some Islamic fundamentalists as a form of loyalty to the colonial
state (Stark 2003 in Podder 2012) and a means by which the American colonizers could co-opt
their leaders and continue dispossessing Muslim tribes from their ancestral lands. Thus, despite
Americans taking control of most of the archipelago – including Mindanao – conflict and violence
in the south remained endemic (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005) up to the 1930s.
But given the military might of the United States, the Muslims eventually gave up their
armed resistance and resorted to collaboration or peaceful negotiations with the Americans
(Banlaoi 2010; Caballero-Anthony 2007; Gowing 1983; Tan 1977). The period from the 1930s
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until the end of WWII was thus a relatively silent period in Mindanao, but it was one that
witnessed the burgeoning of sentiments for Muslim independence.
After WWII, Islam developed an international network, seeking to connect Muslim
populations together under one umma (Islamic Brotherhood). This global wave reached
Mindanao, and mobilized faithful local leaders to rise against the post-American Philippine state
to fight for their independence. Organized separatist movements emerged in the late 1960s and
into the 1970s, immediately following the infamous Jabidah Massacre – an incident in which
members of the Philippine military (AFP) allegedly massacred dozens of Muslim recruits who
escaped their covert training exercises for a plan to reclaim Sabah.
The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was the first separatist group founded in
1968 that aimed to establish a separate Bangsamoro (Muslim nation). Other radical groups soon
followed, including the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BLO) and the more secular Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). From 1973 to 1976, these secessionists engaged in intense
conflict with the Philippine government – a spate of skirmishes that resulted in about 100,000
deaths by the end of the decade (Molloy 1998).
Since 1976, the Philippine government has engaged in cycles of peace talks with the
Muslim separatists in Mindanao – particularly the MNLF –with the government offering semiautonomy through the establishment of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).13
When the MNLF leader Nur Misuari accepted this offer, factions within the MNLF resulted and a
breakaway insurgency group – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – was formed. The
MILF, which adheres to Islamic fundamentalism and the jihad in its struggle for power and

13
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The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was created on August 1, 1989 though Republic Act 6734 (the Organic Act) pursuant
to a Constitutional provision mandating an area in Mindanao, which would be autonomous from the central government. A plebiscite
conducted in 14 provinces and 10 cities, to determine whether the residents agreed to part of the ARMM. Of these provinces and
cities, only four – Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi - voted in favor of the new region. The ARMM was officially
inaugurated on November 6, 1990.
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independence, continues to engage in skirmishes with the government to this day despite ceasefire agreements and peace talks with the MNLF.
The MNLF, on the other hand, openly states that it is not associated or connected to any
terrorist or domestic insurgency movement, and that armed struggle is “obsolete,” (Echeminada
2013) – the reason it has agreed to engage in negotiations with the central government to settle
the Mindanao problem. Most recently14 however, with the latest round of negotiations running into
a brick wall, its leader Nur Misuari declared himself President of the ʻBangsamoro Republik,ʼ and
declared independence for the whole of Mindanao and the island of Palawan in the southwestern
Philippines.15
Amidst all this, the secessionist crusade in Mindanao has been complicated by the
emergence of more radical extremist bands such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Like the MILF,
the professed objective of the ASG is the creation of an independent Islamic state through the
use of force. The case of the ASG – as will be teased out in the subsequent chapter – has
become the most notorious link in this long chain of secessionist movements.
Through the years, the cultural, political and religious discord that emanated from the
Spanish to the American, to the post-colonial era, has remained and turned into a perennial
condition of social unrest and conflict in Mindanao. As a minority group relegated to the southern
part of the country, away from the seat of government in the north, Filipino Muslims remain
largely isolated from the social, economic and political developments in the country, causing
resentments between Christians and Muslims to remain high (Fernando: 1979, Rahman: 1954).
But more significantly, the once purely religious conflict has evolved into a deep-seated power
struggle between various social, political and cultural institutions in the region. This five-century,
second-oldest conflict on earth – next only to the conflict between North and South Sudan that
14
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On August 12, 2013.
15
Available at Gulf News online: http://gulfnews.com/news/world/philippines/misuari-declares-independence-of-mindanao-southernphilippines-1.1220970. Accessed on 14 July 2013.
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began in the 10th century (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005) – is thus arguably not coming to a
close anytime soon.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS
Centuries of conflict in the southern Philippines have undoubtedly taken their toll on the
cultural and socio-economic landscape of the region. As Caballero-Anthony (2007) observes, the
“failure of the Spanish to subjugate the Moros and the impressive feat displayed by the latter to
successfully defend their territory and remain uncolonized…could not however mitigate the
massive devastation that resulted from the 333 years of aggression.” The political and economic
decay that resulted from severing productive links with the rest of the Philippines and Asia led to
widespread poverty as the Moros “focused attention to fighting off the enemy rather than to
productive endeavors” (Rodil 2002).
Despite being considered the agricultural basin of the Philippines that produces eight of
the ten main exports of the country (Calderon 2004), Mindanao remains the most impoverished
region with the latest census showing 10 of the 15 poorest provinces in the Philippines belonging
to it.16 The ARMM has consistently figured into the bottom cluster of the countryʼs geo-political
regions for years, with a poverty incidence among families between 42 to 47% in the first
semesters of 2006, 2009, and 2012.17 It also has the lowest functional literacy rate in the country
(69%)18 and life expectancy at 57 years (Chalk 1997 cited in Rabasa and Chalk 2001). More
interesting is the fact that 64% of people living in Mindanao consider themselves poor – up from
only 30% recorded in 2011 – according to a 2013 survey on self-rated poverty conducted by the
Philippinesʼ Social Weather Stations (SWS). This is not surprising as most provinces in the

16
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1st Semester 2012 Poverty Statistics released by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) on Tuesday, April 23, 2013.
Ibid, from Rappler, Available at http://www.rappler.com/business/27276-poorest-provinces-philippines “MAP: The poorest provinces
in PH.”
18
From the 2003 Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS), National Statistics Office. Available at
http://www.census.gov.ph/content/literacy-status-filipinos-results-2003-functional-literacy-education-and-mass-media-survey
17
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region have limited or no access to basic social services, such as education, health, water supply
and even electricity – with up to 8-hour daily power outages projected until 2015.19
In an environment beset by constant political unrest coupled with seemingly interminable
impoverishment and a dearth of economic opportunities, how is survival and order achieved?
How does a marginalized society operate and persist? In Mindanao, the answer is one that is a
consequence of history and tradition: order is established through power and might.
The Moro struggle for continued autonomy in the face of the Spaniards and Americans
(Milligan 2003) enshrined the use of force – when necessary – as a means to defend their
Muslim way of life in Mindanao. Moreover, given the regionʼs lack of resources and the inability of
the central state to carry out the rule of law in the area, the supremacy of feudal clans (stemming
from centuries of dominant sultanates), that became local warlords during WWII as part of “antiJapanese guerilla forces” set up by the United States (Abinales 2009), and then turned into local
private armies in support of the Marcos dictatorship, has led to the pervasiveness of a ʻculture of
warlordism.ʼ
In Mindanao, the gun establishes order (Ressa 2013)20. ʻRido,ʼ21 or violent clan feuding
for power and resources, is a staple of daily life (Husin 2010). Since the 1930s, there have been
about 1,300 cases of rido documented across Mindanao that have resulted in more than 5,000
killings (Husin 2010). While clan wars are not unique to Muslim communities, Mindanao or the
Philippines, its pervasiveness in the ARMM has wider implications for conflicts (Canuday 2007,
cited in Husin 2008) and more importantly, how the institutions of power are shaped in the
region. When clan feuds of this nature occur in the same environment where separatist
19

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

“Mindanao Power Crisis: Brownouts to worsen next month as repair of plants starts,”
Available at http://www.interaksyon.com/business/67003/mindanao-power-crisis--brownouts-to-worsen-next-month-as-repair-ofplants-begins. Accessed on 10 July 2013.
20
Also confirmed through authorʼs interviews, December 2012-January 2013.
21
Rido is a term commonly used by Maranaos and Iranuns (indigenous groups in Mindanao), which refers to a state of conflict where
parties involved resort to violent retaliations and counter retaliations resulting to cyclic systems of vengeance. What makes Rido
different from other violent conflicts are the tendencies of parties to retaliate violently targeting not just the offender but also other
members of the family or clan. See Lingga in “Understanding Rido”, Right to Self-Determination, Autonomy and Peace review, IAG
Quarterly (2005:68-69)
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movements operate, the parties to local feuds become intertwined with both the military and
secessionist forces – a situation wherein interests are meshed, loyalties become nebulous, and
conflicts escalate. As Canuday (2007) notes:
“Feuds tend to interact in unfortunate ways with separatist conflicts. Such interplays
occur when parties to local feuds are themselves part of the military resources of both
the state and the rebel forces, or where state or rebel forces in ongoing-armed
secessionists confrontations tap local armed groups.”

This interplay becomes more interesting when one realizes that Muslim separatist movements
have been actively trying to claim their autonomy and control over Mindanao since the 1970s; yet
Muslim clan bosses and warlords have remained supreme over the territory. The latter have
maintained power by keeping themselves in favor with the central government as cronies (during
the Marcos regime) or elected officials who are deeply entrenched in a system of patronage. This
translates to a clanʼs monopoly of resources, guns and ultimately, power (Ferrer 2010). And
power, in this part of the country dubbed as the Philippinesʼ ʻWild Wild West,ʼ provides the holder
with a license to use might and violence against anyone who threatens to take it (Ferrer 2010) –
including separatists who may get in their way.
Following Joel Migdalʼs (1988; as cited in Ferrer 2010) ʻweak state-strong societyʼ
theory, it can be argued that the southern Philippines is a victim of a ʻweak stateʼ – a region with
a broken local governance structure and an absence of law enforcement – and a ʻstrong societyʼ
– a situation where influential groups such as feudal clans, warlords or rebels as in the case of
Mindanao make significant demands on state institutions. This ʻweak state-strong societyʼ
combination has turned Mindanao into a fertile and favorable ground for movements that wish to
obtain material and symbolic power by challenging political, social and cultural institutions. It is a
combination that makes violence not only a preferred tactic of such movements, but one that is
inescapable. In exploring the origins and the dynamics of the ASG, we will soon realize that such
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a context has made a significant impact on the operations and tactical choices of the movement
over time.
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Chapter 6. THE SUBJECT OF STUDY
Knowing the “Enemy”
The death of Osama bin Laden may have put closure on the protracted manhunt for the
most wanted terrorist in the world; but this milestone in the war on terror 22 has far from
eliminated the global threat of terrorism. Despite heightened counterterrorism efforts after the
tragedy of 9/11 we remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks from external and local perpetrators
(Bergen 2011). The threat, however, is not confined to the United States.
Unbeknownst to many, Southeast Asia is one of the most threatened regions in the
world. Recognized as the second front in the global war on terror just after the Middle East
(Gershman 2002), Southeast Asia has become a convenient operations base for international
terrorist networks owing to its porous borders, weak immigration control and historically close
trade links with the Middle East. Despite counterterrorism efforts in the region through several
declarations and treaties among countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
condemning terrorism and stipulating the need to share military manpower and intelligence,
militancy and insurgency continue to rise 23 . The situation is particularly alarming in the
Philippines, where violence and terrorist activity remains a tool used by Islamic extremist and
separatist groups in Mindanao. The most notorious of these Muslim separatist bands in the
Philippines is the Abu Sayyaf Group.
The Abu Sayyaf – Arabic for ʻsword bearerʼ or ʻfather of the swordʼ (Torres 2001) – is
one of the smallest terrorist groups in Southeast Asia (latest estimates show that it only has
anywhere from 200 to 500 members24), yet it is one of the most aggressive and feared. It has
reported connections to Jemaah Islamiyah – the most notorious Islamic fundamentalist group in
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Editorial, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2011 “After Osama bin Laden: The long-term consequences of the Al Qaeda leader's death
will be complicated and not always what Americans hope for.” Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/03/opinion/la-edbinladen-20110503. Accessed on 8 August 2012.
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Based on a Congressional Report on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2009) prepared the Congressional Research Service; confirmed
in interviews of the author with scholars and military intelligence officers.
24
Ibid.

!

%,!

Indonesia that also engages in terrorism – and the Al Qaeda network. As a result, it has found
itself on the United Statesʼ list of “most wanted” foreign terrorist organizations (Turner 2003),
and has been designated by the United Nations as one of the three main terrorist organizations
in Southeast Asia along with JI and Al Qaeda (Thayer 2005, cited in Banlaoi 2010). Shortly after
the 9/11 attacks, it was even argued that the ASG resurfaced as “one of the more important
terrorist groups” facing the Philippines, the United States and the entire Southeast Asian region
(Abuza 2005).
Despite the predominant view that the ASG is a terrorist organization, perceptions have
mounted – including from the Philippine government (Banlaoi 2010), the military and police25 –
that the group is merely a gang of bandits26 indiscriminately engaging in extortion, kidnap for
ransom, and even drug trafficking 27 . Nevertheless, the claim of the ASG remains: that it
legitimately represents the desire of the Muslims in Mindanao to establish a separate Islamic
state (Banlaoi 2010), and that it will continue uphold the jihad as it does so.
ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENT
Exactly when and how the ASG was formed has been the subject of numerous
conflicting accounts from intelligence officers and scholars alike. The precise date of its
establishment is unknown, with estimates being between 1989-1991 (Banlaoi 2010; 2006; Vitug
and Gloria 2000; Rabasa and Chalk 2001; Turner 1995). However, government and intelligence
reports,28 as well as information shared with me during my interviews with intelligence officers
and scholars in Manila, show that recruitment began in 1989 when its Filipino founder and
leader, Abdurajak Janjalani, allegedly returned to the Philippines from being a mujahideen in
Afghanistan to form what was supposedly a group of freedom fighters for an independent
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Authorʼs interview with Philippine police intelligence, 07 January 2013.
Former President Arroyo repeatedly referred to the ASG as “Abu Sayyaf bandits”
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Authorʼs interviews with a scholar, military officers and military intelligence, 27 December 2012; 02 and 07
January 2013.
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Including one from the Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (no date given, p.6).
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Islamic state in Mindanao. The Philippine military initially believed that the group was a
militaristic unit and referred to it as the Mujahedeen Commando Freedom Fighters (Atkinson
2012, Banlaoi 2010). But testimony from a former leader of the ASG29 reveals that Jamaah
Tableeg was the actual group that preceded the ASG – one that propagated Islam through
symposia and discussions rather than through violence or military operations (Banlaoi 2010).
From the core of Jamaah Tableeg arose what we now know as the ASG, initially referred
to by Janjalani as Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah or AHAI (Banlaoi 2008)30. AHAI was created by
Janjalani to wage jihad qital – an armed struggle (Abuza 2005; Ressa 2012, citing Banaloi
2008) – or jihad fi sabilillah, which translates to “a holy and just war for the cause of Allah”
(Khattab 1995) or “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam” (Banlaoi 2008). The name Abu
Sayyaf was apparently only Janjalaniʼs nom de guerre (Ressa 2012, Banlaoi 2010) taken from
renowned Afghan mujahedeen Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Since Janjalani signed this name below his
teachings and statements representing his movement, the group was then referred to as ʻAbu
Sayyafʼ by the Philippine military with the term subsequently adopted by the media.31
The change in the direction of the movement from a scholarly and peaceful propagation
of Islam to an armed struggle was apparently triggered by Janjalaniʼs discontent with Nur
Misuari and the MNLFʼs decision to abandon the demand for independence, 32 and the
subsequent establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Philippine
constitution. Janjalani remained committed to achieving a fully independent state in Mindanao
(Turner 2003). With this new group, Janjalani thus effectively merged Salafi Wahhabism – a
movement associated with a puritanical and literalist approach to Islam – with the long-running
pursuit for Muslim independence in the Southern Philippines (Ressa 2012).
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This leader was identified as Noor Umog in Balnaloi (2010).
This was also confirmed during the authorʼs interviews in Manila with a scholar, a military officer and other intelligence officers, 27
December 2012; 2 January 2013; 11 January 2013.
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Authorʼs interview with a scholar, 27 December 2013.
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From Maria Ressaʼs interview with “Mohammad,” a former leader of the ASG (Ressa 2012).
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ORGANIZATION AND RECRUITMENT
As an organization, the ASG was envisioned as a “highly organized, systematic
and disciplined” system of Muslim fighters in Mindanao with a military arm (Banlaoi 2005, 2006).
It was to be headed by an executive council chaired by Janjalani and supported by 15 other
amirs. This council would have two special committees – one that would oversee fundraising
and another that would take charge of ʻpropaganda and agitationʼ (Banlaoi 2006).
The death of Janjalani in 1998 was a blow to the ASG, however, and this
visualized system of administration was never fully realized. Khadaffy Janjalani, Abdurajakʼs
younger brother, took over the reins and became the nominal leader until his death by military
hands in 2006. But unlike his brother, Khadaffy was not a charismatic leader nor was he an
educated ideologue.33 So although he tried to revive the ASGʼs agenda, the group began to split
into several factions as a result of the loss of a strong leader and ideologue that bound them.
Khadaffy allegedly led the Sulu faction while another top leader, Galib Andang, controlled the
Jolo faction (Banlaoi 2010). Concurrent with the emergence of factions was the beginning of the
“degeneration” of the ASG into a bandit group (Abuza 2005) that carried out a spree of kidnap
for ransom (KFR) activities from 2000 to 2004 – operations that were far from being a staple of
the ASG strategy under Abdurajak Janjalaniʼs leadership. Galib Andang allegedly led these KFR
activities until he was captured and imprisoned. When he was killed in 2004 as he was
attempting a jailbreak, the KFR activities of ASG also abated (Abuza 2005) and the group
returned to high-profile bombing attacks.
Intelligence reports alleged that Khadaffy Janjalani was succeeded in 2007 by
one of the two top leaders in Jolo – a radical ideologue named Yassir Igasan who studied
Islamic jurisprudence in Syria. Philippine military officials considered this choice of a leader a
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“plus factor for a group that [was] trying to reinvent itself”34 after a long episode of straying from
ideology-based extremist activities. However, more recent intelligence has shown that Radullan
Sahiron, the only living co-founder of the ASG – and thus the most senior – is the supreme
leader of the group. As a result, the United Statesʼ Rewards for Justice program has put a $1
million price tag on Sahironʼs head.
Nevertheless, Abuza (2008) posits that since the mid-2000s, the ASG has “lacked any
semblance of leadership” owing to the internal rifts brought by ideological and operational
differences. This could also be the case as the movement is now infiltrated by poorly
indoctrinated or radicalized members whose involvement is contingent only on whether or not
they can obtain protection or immediate financial gain.35
THE CAUSE AND ITS LINKS
A learned scholar of theology and Islamic jurisprudence who pursued further studies in
Libya, Syria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Vitug and Gloria 2003, Banlaoi 2008), Abdurajak
Janjalani was known to be a charismatic leader, preacher and ideologue.36 Around four years
before he was killed in a shoot-out with the Philippine police in 1998, Janjalani penned the “Four
Basic Truths” about the ASG to clarify the ʻtrueʼ motivations and essence of the organization
(Tan 1993, also cited in Banlaoi 2006, 2010 and Atkinson 2012):
(1) Its goal is not to establish nor promote factions between Muslim struggles, as this would
be contrary to the teachings of Islam. The objective of the ASG is to serve as a bridge
between the revolutionary forces of both the MNLF and MILF whose roles and leadership
in this struggle cannot be ignored.
(2) Its ultimate strategic goal is the creation of a purely Islamic state whose “nature,
meaning, emblem and objective” are synonymous with peace.
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“Yasser Igasan succeeds Janjalani as Abu chief” GMA News Online, June 27, 2007. Available at
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/48531/news/regions/yasser-igasan-succeeds-janjalani-as-abu-chief. Accessed on
August 13, 2013.
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Authorʼs interviews with a scholar, journalist and military intelligence officer in Manila, 27 December 2012; 2 January 2013; 11
January 2013.
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Authorʼs interviews with a scholar, journalist and military intelligence officials in Manila who all interacted with, were immersed
with, or interviewed members of the ASG; 27 December 2012; 2 January 2013; 11 January 2013.
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(3) Its advocacy of war is a necessity so long as the “oppression, injustice, capricious
ambitions, and arbitrary claims imposed on Muslims” exist.
(4) It believes that “war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective
of humanity – the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the
noble Quran and the purified Sunnah.”

These tenets were not merely a function of Janjalaniʼs intelligence and exposure to Islamic
theology abroad. It is important to note that these were products of close ties with a larger
Islamic fundamentalist movement and the latterʼs calculating process of expansion and
indoctrination into a space that included the realm in which Janjalani revolved.
This is a significant point: In 1988, a year before Janjalani returned to the Philippines to
recruit people to his cause, Osama bin Ladenʼs al-Qaeda network was formed (Ressa 2012).
Bin Ladenʼs brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, traveled to the Philippines to establish a
financial network in the country in support of a local terrorist cell that would aid in their master
plan to carry out “some of al-Qaedaʼs most imaginative and deadliest attacks around the world”
(Ressa 2012). That cell was Janjalaniʼs Abu Sayyaf. More than a dozen charities and nongovernmental organizations37 were created to funnel money into the ASG (and MILF) as well as
Islamic centers that taught the faith to recruits. One of those centers was Darul Imam Shafiʼie –
a school under the NGO International Islamic Relief Organization also founded by Khalifa – that
served as a local mill for ideologically driven members of the ASG and MILF (Ressa 2012).
Janjalani was a student at Darul Imam Shafiʼie, where he would meet fellow fundamentalists
who would later become other co-founders and leaders of the ASG.
In an interview by journalist and Southeast Asia security expert Maria Ressa (2012) with
one of the former leaders of the ASG, it was clear that the education Janjalani received at Darul
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Maria Ressa (2012) provides a comprehensive list of these organizations in her recent book: Benevolence International Foundation
(BIF), International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), International Relief and Information Center (IRIC), Islamic Wisdom
Worldwide Mission (IWWM), Markazzo Shabab Al-Islamiyah (MSI), Muslim World League, Darul Hijra Foundations, Islamic World
Committee Foundation (IWCF), Khalifa Trading Industries, International Islamic Efforts Foundation (IIEF), Darul Ehsan Foundation,
Darul Imam Shafiʼie Foundation, Islamic Dawah Guidance Council, Darul Hijra Foundation, Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance
(ISCAG), and Islamic Students Association of the Philippines (ISAP).
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Imam Shafiʼie greatly influenced his ideology and actions. The former leader, who joined the
ASG for ideological reasons, shares his thoughts with her:
“I felt it was my obligation to take part in jihad after Darul Imam. Jihad means fighting to
regain our lost homeland and living under a purely Islamic state. We were told that it is our
obligation to establish sharia law and that we are sinners unless we do that. So we thought
during that time that people who do not join us are all sinners and enemies. Janjalani was
telling us that God does not need numbers. He needs the pure in heart, and as long as we
38
are sincere, God will help us.”

This conscious strategy of founding schools and Islamic centers in the Philippines (and other
parts of Southeast Asia where Islam already had a stronghold) was a means for al-Qaeda to
effectively expand its network and deeply indoctrinate more recruits into their grand scheme. For
Janjalani, the link to al-Qaeda was a means of amassing strong moral support and a steady flow
of resources for the local cause of the ASG. The result was a robust connection between the
core and the cell with Janjalani reportedly establishing contact with Osama bin Laden during the
formerʼs stay in Pakistan39 (Abuza 1993 cited in Banlaoi 2010) as well as befriending Ramzi
Yousef – the convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and coconspirator of the Bojinka plots that were planned while he was in the Philippines (Banlaoi
2012).
The ASG also reportedly established ties with Jemaah Islamiyaah (JI), Indonesiaʼs most
notorious Islamic extremist group. By 2005, intelligence officers believed that about 70 JI
members had penetrated and operated from the Philippines (Banlaoi 2010) with the help of the
ASG.40 The JIʼs most infamous bomb maker – Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi – also admitted to
traveling to the Philippines for months at a time, staying in Mindanao and plotting bombings to
be carried out in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore.
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Maria Ressaʼs interview with “Mohammad,” a former leader of the ASG (2012:62).
This report of Janjalani meeting with Osama bin Laden was actually contested by one of the scholars I interviewed.
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This was from Rommel Banlaoiʼs interview with Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan, Director of the PNP Intelligence
Group, held at Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 1, 2005. See also the U.S. Congressional Report on Terrorism in Southeast
Asia (2009).
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Having ideological and operational ties to a larger global network of Islamic extremist
movements that have operated similarly for years, one could argue that ASG operations and
tactics should be fairly predictable: a series of violent, large-scale, destructive attacks on state
institutions, public establishments, and/or civilians with a significant material and symbolic
impact. Yet, while the ASGʼs tactics have been perennially violent, the specific tactics have
evolved. This has led scholars and intelligence officers alike to take a second look at the
movement and the seemingly more nuanced path it is taking. The next section takes a deeper
look at the tactics of the ASG over time.
THE TACTICS
The ASG has historically engaged in violent tactics ranging from bombings,
assassinations/beheadings, kidnappings and kidnap for ransom activities, and extortion.41 In
August 1991, the ASG unleashed its first ever act of terror on the M/V Doulos, a Christian
missionary ship docked in Zamboanga, a highly urbanized province at the southeastern tip of
Mindanao (Atkinson 2012 citing Banlaoi 2006; Vitug and Gloria 2002 in Turner 2003). A few
months after, a series of attacks on Christian targets took place in Mindanao, including
shootings of a priest and pastor, the bombing of a Dominican convent, and a kidnapping of a
priest in Basilan (Turner 1995, 2003) – acts that were later revealed to be motivated by
Janjalaniʼs belief that the active preaching by Christian missionaries “gravely insulted Islam” and
provoked Muslims to respond violently (Banlaoi 2006). However, it was not until a bomb
exploded at the Zamboanga airport in 1993 that the groupʼs name gained traction and
widespread infamy (Turner 2003).
Bombings and kidnappings continued to escalate in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga
through the mid 1990s (Vitug and Gloria 2002; Turner 1995). The Philippine military conducted
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an intensified campaign against the extremists, claiming in early 1995 that they were able to
suppress the groupʼs operatives. They were mistaken. What followed in April 1995 was a
ghastly attack on the predominantly Catholic town of Ipil, a small town in the province of
Zamboanga del Sur. The group looted, burned and destroyed buildings and homes,
indiscriminately killing 53 innocent men, women and children (Vitug and Gloria 2002; Turner
1995, 2003; Ressa 2012). According to a former leader of ASG, the Ipil raid was “part of a
master plan that included exploiting religious and ethnic fissures to foment chaos, a formula that
would later be used in plots in Singapore and Indonesia” (Ressa 2012:71). The ASG did not
simply attack state or social institutions for its cause; it incited religious strife as part of its larger
project to justify its cause, increase recruitment, and gain international recognition (Ressa 2012)
as serious Islamic warriors.
But remarkably, after a 150% increase in attacks from 1991 to 1995 (Ressa 2012), the
ASG fell into a period of silence after the Ipil massacre. Abuza (1995) offered a possible reason
for this “quiet”42 period when he described the years from 1995-2000 as one of “degeneration.”
Prior to 1995, Ramzi Yousef – the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing –
established a base in the Philippines to train members of the ASG and set up the first al-Qaeda
cell in the country (Ressa 2012). When his Bojinka plot was foiled (together with what would
later be known as the ʻblueprint for 9/11ʼ) during his arrest and raid of his Manila apartment in
1995, the ASG began a “steady decline” and atrophied (Abuza 2005:7). The elimination of the
financial link between the ASG and al-Qaeda – a link that Yousef previously provided – led to
the disruption of international resource flows from bin Ladenʼs treasury into ASG coffers43.
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This does not mean that the ASG completely halted all its operations. There were still small-scale attacks that ranged from
kidnappings to bombings, the latter suspected to be done as part of training exercises or test runs carried out by the ASG
together with Al-Qaeda liked terrorist cells in preparation for major attacks like the Bojinka plot, among others (Authorʼs interviews
with military intelligence, a journalist and scholar in Manila).
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Philippine and U.S. intelligence reports point to the financial connections between al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamyiah and the ASG, with
the first two groups funneling money to the latter through shell NGOs and organizations created by Yousef. Funds were also said
to come from Islamic supporters from the Middle East and South Asia, including Hezbollah in Iran, Jamaat-Islami and Hizbul-
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Without any funding for its operations, the ASG began engaging in small-scale kidnapfor-ransom activities in the late 1990s. But after Abdurajak Janjalaniʼs death in 1999, it was no
surprise that the ideologue-less ASG made its comeback through a spate of high-profile
kidnappings in 2000. In March of that year, it kidnapped 55 schoolteachers and children in
Basilan. A month after, it made waves in the global arena as it kidnapped 21 tourists at a dive
resort in Sipadan, Malaysia. One year later, they again kidnapped 30 tourists at the Dos Palmas
resort in Palawan. These large-scale, kidnap-for-ransom operations – with ransom demands
reaching $1 million per hostage – skyrocketed the ASG into the most wanted terrorist lists of
both the Philippine and U.S. governments. At the same time, it turned public perception of the
ASG around from that of Islamic secessionists with a legitimate cause to that of ruthless,
criminal bandits without a political agenda. Testimonies from former members of the ASG who
defected during this period of degradation support the assertion that the ASG was driven not by
ideology but by survival:
“. . . the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not for Islam but for
personal gratification. We abducted people not anymore for the cause of Islam, but for
money.” (Abuza 2005:8)
“Itʼs not what I wanted to do [referring to the Ipil massacre]. I want to do what we have
44
been told about the Afghan War, military operations like the NPA, ambush of the military.
Thatʼs okay, but not attacking civilians…the group was on the wrong path with
kidnappings, extortion, and bombings…The Abu Sayyaf abused and harmed the
people…” (Ressa 2012)

The labeling of the ASG as a terrorist group led to the Philippine government declaring
an all-out military operation called Balikatan against the movement in 2002. In response to the
operation, the ASG carried out a bomb attack in Zamboanga, killing two civilians and a U.S.
soldier. This signified the ASGʼs return to bombings as a key tactic (Abuza 2005). But supported
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NPA is the “New Peopleʼs Army,” a communist insurgency group in the Philippines since the 1960s.
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by the United States in terms of military troops 45 and financial aid, Balikatan reportedly
significantly weakened the ASG. From a high of over 1000 members, the ASG dwindled to a
core of around 200-400 fighters (Abuza 2005).
Despite persistent military and police operations against the ASG, the group has
managed to “regenerate” (Abuza 2005) and continue engaging in violent tactics. The early
2000s saw large-scale bombings, among others the Davao airport and Sasa Wharf bombing
that killed 48 and wounded 204; the SuperFerry bombing that killed more than 100 passengers
in the deadliest militant maritime attack in history; the General Santos public market bombing
that killed 14 and wounded 70; and the ʻValentineʼs Day bombingsʼ that killed 11 and wounded
many others in three near-simultaneous attacks in Makati (the central business district of
Manila), Zamboanga and General Santos.46
Alongside these attacks were kidnappings where both foreigners and locals were taken
hostage. These incidents, however, mostly ended in executions with the intent being to kill
informants or intelligence officers (Abuza 2005). It was not until 2008 when a team of journalists
from the Philippinesʼ top media outfit was captured by ASG operatives that the group again
turned to high profile, large-scale kidnap-for-ransom activities as part of its strategy. Given this
primary tactic of choice, and the fact that the ASG has not claimed responsibility for any
bombing attack since the early 2000s,47 the group has again been widely viewed as more of a
criminal menace than a serious extremist or terrorist threat.
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The U.S. military sent 1,300 troops and 160 special operations personnel as part of the Bush administrations post-9/11 national
security strategy or “war on terror.”
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Data culled from Human Rights Watch and the New York Times. Available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/philippines0707/background/2.htm#_Toc168986109;
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/asia/25iht-pirates.1.18133159.html?_r=0.
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There have been recorded bombings in Mindanao since 2008, but the ASG has not claimed responsibility for any of them.
Intelligence records and news reports (as well as those found on the Global Terrorism Database), only “suspect” that the activities
were conducted by ASG militants. According to a scholar I interviewed, these bombings are usually carried out by the ASG
recruits in training as a culmination of their course on IEDs or bomb making; as a sort of test of their skills. They are not meant to
harm civilians, but if ever there are people hurt, those are merely collateral damage.
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Figure 2. Incidence of ASG Violence (confirmed and suspected), 1994-2011
Source: Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland.

Note: Data and graph on the ASG were specifically generated by the author from the database
(http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), and then downloaded into an external spreadsheet for use in this
study.

Nevertheless, as a group that has managed to conduct more than 400 attacks and acts
of violence over two decades (Atkinson 2012), kill hundreds of men, women, and children, and
commit acts of violence at a generally increasing rate over time (Figure 2), the ASG has not
budged from its place on the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and is a staple focus of
the Philippinesʼ anti-terrorism strategy.
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Chapter 7. THE ANALYSIS
Cracking the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group
Collective action groups that are created to generate social change have employed
various means of doing so throughout centuries. As groups that often engage in ʻcontentious
politicsʼ to resist elite power, challenge policy, or simply make a political point, social
movements have engaged in disruptive, yet arguably peaceful, means. But in recent history, the
manifestation of contentious politics has drastically transformed (Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999;
Tilly 2008). Social movements that once simply gathered within cordoned lines in front of public
or private establishments or rallied along Main Street (or Wall Street) with their placards, may
today very well move beyond burning flags to hurling IEDs at buildings, or planting bombs on
commuter trains. Clearly, the spectrum of social movement tactics provides us with two
categorical choices: violence or non-violence. And the ASG – as a radical, extremist SMO –
has blatantly approved of the former as its tactic of choice.
As I examine the case of the ASG to understand why violence has been its fundamental
means of contention, and why it has chosen to engage in the specific set of violent tactics it has
carried out for decades, I will endeavor to view it as an SMO that is a product of the interaction of
its raison d'être and the power dynamics of the multi-institutional context within which it operates.
Following Armstrong and Bernsteinʼs (2008) multi-institutional politics approach to social
movements, I aim to go beyond the fundamental assumptions of political process theory as
posited by McAdam (1982) that domination (i.e., the structure which is contested by social
movements) is organized by and around a single source of power – the state. I also aim to move
beyond the assumption that political and economic structures determine the course and
dynamics of social movements, and instead consider the impact of culture and other social
institutions on the tactical choices of the ASG. For a movement like the ASG, which by its very
nature is not a typical social movement organization that merely protests on the streets of
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Mindanao, such assumptions will not allow us to adequately understand the nature of dominance
vis-à-vis state and non-state institutions in their society and how this consequently impacts the
forms by which they challenge such institutions.
EXPLAINING THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A TACTIC
If one applies the political process theory to explain the dynamics of the ASG and why it
has chosen to violently challenge the status quo the way it has in order to achieve a separate
Islamic state in Mindanao, the answer may seem easily discernible: the ASG has been long
frustrated with the dominant ʻChristianʼ government, which has perennially marginalized the
Muslims in the south through political and economic disenfranchisement; thus, it engages in
excessive violence to radically challenge the existing polity as doing so is the only way for a
traditionally marginalized minority to gain attention and make an impact. But looking back at the
history of the Philippines – particularly the lingering struggle in Mindanao – and taking that
together with the singular culture that emanated from and was shaped by the interplay of this
history with existing political, economic and social structures in that region, the answer to the
question becomes more complex.
In Mindanao, domination is not organized solely around the state. In fact, while the
central government oversees the region, and democratic local government structures are
significantly in place, these state institutions are highly dysfunctional. They prove no match
against the traditional clan structures of authority in the south, and the corruption that such a
structure breeds. So indeed, while the ASGʼs ultimate goal is to defeat the central government
and create its own Islamic state, its resort to violence and the particular tactics it has chosen is
more a result of a “perfect cocktail” (Ressa 2012) of conditions rather than a mere reaction to the
overreach of the state. The members of the ASG are not simply excluded from the polity or
deprived by the governmentʼs decision-making processes because of being Islamic extremists;
rather they are primarily disadvantaged by the rules and structures of the cultural, historical and
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socio-economic conditions in the southern Philippines. They are not simply struggling for mere
inclusion into the larger Philippine society as a marginalized minority, but rather looking for
change in the cultural and social institutions within Mindanao. They are seeking to change the
rules; to find their place alongside the traditional power holders in the region, but are doing so
while having also been shaped by the very institutions they are challenging. For the ASG,
achieving power and authority in Mindanao is not only a function of achieving statehood; the
success of their movement depends more significantly on the control of the material and
symbolic sources of power in a region beset by impoverishment and perennial strife: guns, gold,
goons, and honor.
The Role of History, Ideology and Culture
The strategy of the ASG has long been “characterized by ruthlessly violent acts
specifically targeted towards Christians” (Atkinson 2012:5) With this anti-Christian sentiment in
mind, it can be argued that the ASGʼs conscious decision to engage in violence is a continuation
of the Moro struggle for autonomy since the 14th century; a way of life that has been enshrined in
Mindanao as a result of wars with the Spanish and American colonizers, and the necessary use
of force by the Moros to defend their faith and their homeland. It can also be assumed that since
the ASG was founded on the principle of jihad quital, waging war to create an independent
Muslim state, its founding members felt a steadfast duty to engage in violence as warriors of
Islam. As one of the former leaders of the ASG mentioned, it was their “obligation” as Muslims to
take part in the jihad (Ressa 2012).
The complication in the case of the ASG is that its separatist struggle is not as
ideologically pure as it seems. The movement was born and enmeshed in an environment that
has had a protracted history of violence and a long-standing culture of warlordism; a culture
fueled by the centuries-long dominance of feudal clans and dynasties that have gained and
maintained their power through the acquisition of firearms, private armies, wealth and even
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public office. According to Mercado (2010:19), warlordism in Mindanao “continues to characterize
the power relations not only between clans and families but also between the central power
(Manila) and the periphery.” Violence is thus not only seen as a means of attaining power by the
traditional Muslim clans, but also by the Muslims in the periphery – disadvantaged and
disenfranchised individuals who would like to taste power, such as those who choose to join or
support the ASG.
Known leaders and members of the ASG do not belong to these high profile clans; most
targeted recruits are even orphans of former MILF rebels or “martyred” ASG members.48 This
conscious strategy of recruiting impoverished and marginalized orphans was shared with me
during several of the interviews I conducted with intelligence officers, scholars and journalists
who interacted at one point with the ASG. In one interview, it became clear that these orphans
were the main recruitment targets of the ASG, as these individuals are deemed crucial to
establish the type of loyalty akin to clans:
I: So, how would you describe their recruitment process? Do the leaders launch a call for recruits?
And then do these recruits study?
R: There are multiple means of recruitment… There is a “push and pull” factor. There are a lot of pull
factors but my favorite is their penetration of orphans, because these are the easiest to recruit.
I: Because of a sense of “family”?
R: Yes, those who are orphaned – when their fathers are killed, [the ASG] tells them “They [the
government] killed your father. So join us. Iʼm your family.” That was the strategy of Khair Mundos [a
prominent ASG leader]… And they really train these children. He [Khair Mundos] tells then, “Itʼs okay
that you lost your father. But donʼt worry, your father died as a martyr and Iʼm here as your father. Iʼm
gonna make you live the way your father wanted.”
I: So these are the orphans of former ASG members?
R: I was actually just texting [mentions name of a general] and I told him, “Sir, these are the new
recruits now.” He said, “Wait, these surnames are familiar to me. Ask them how they are related to-” And I told him, “Sir, those men were their fathers.” He [the general] said, “Oh my god. Those were
49
the men I eliminated.” This is because they had Task Force Sky and they wiped out the ASG in [a
particular place], right? Thatʼs our governmentʼs policy, right? All out war against the ASG. They
[the government] donʼt know that the ASG is like a monster that sprouts two heads when you cut off
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Authorʼs interviews with a scholar, military intelligence and police officers in Manila, 27 December 2012; 2 January 2013.
Not the real name of the Task Force. Name here was changed for security purposes.
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one. Just like the Hydra. Then, when you decapitate it again, the two heads will become four. Thatʼs
50
the ASG.

From securing the loyalty of orphans, the ASG then expands its network by recruiting immediate
family members and relatives, and then by marrying into each otherʼs families to gain stronger
ties. In another of my interviews with a journalist who had spoken to a member of the ASG, this
strong network accordingly becomes a source of protection:
I: So orphans of former members – are they being recruited actively?
R: I know that thatʼs the media line but – if Iʼd only go with the networks I followed from the
kidnapping [referring to a specific kidnapping incident of the ASG] – these are aunts, theyʼre
extended family. So they – yes. Yes, in general I think thatʼs the case. Because itʼs not even
51
that they have to be actively recruited. Itʼs that they have no other options. And Samuel
[former member of ASG] said the same thing. I said, when you go back are you gonna join the
Abu Sayyaf? And he said, “Is there any other way?” He said, “If I donʼt do that, then no one will
protect me.” Understand: when thereʼs no law and order, they need to gang up together. So
thatʼs where it is. Itʼs gangs. Itʼs groups. Take out the name Abu Sayyaf, this is just a group to
52
protect each other. And to get money, right?

This turns ASG into its own clan. It is an intimate group founded on kinship and
intermarriages (Ressa 2012; Banlaoi 2008), and supported by a tightly knit Islamic community
willing to cover up for its atrocities in exchange for material benefits. As a result, the members
who have not traditionally felt a sense of protection and power by belonging to a traditional and
powerful clan satisfy these sentiments by being a member of the ASG. More than ideology, this
sense of loyalty and belonging acts as the binding factor that provides them with sanctuary
(Ressa 2012). Therefore, if the ASG – as a clan – is to survive and become successful in
achieving their aims, it is thus necessary to adopt the ways by which power and authority are
customarily achieved in the southern Philippines, that is through violence and might. This is the
reason why the strategy of violence adopted by the ASG cannot simply be understood through
an explanation that only looks at the groupʼs interplay with the state, as well as Janjalaniʼs
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Not the real name. Name changed for confidentiality purposes.
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Authorʼs interview with a journalist in Manila, 11 January 2013.
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proclaimed ideological ʻtruthsʼ about the group. Their resort to violence, while indeed initially
motivated by Muslim separatism and jihad qital, is reinforced – and even demanded – by the
history of a violent struggle for independence and the culture of warlordism in Mindanao;
institutions that have shaped the power dynamics in their immediate society, and ultimately, their
actions.
EXPLAINING THE CHOICE AND ENDURANCE OF A UNIQUE SET OF TACTICS
People not familiar with the ASG or the Philippinesʼ historical context might predict that
the ASG – as an Islamic fundamentalist and extremist group – engages in the ʻusualʼ mélange of
tactics for its terror campaign: large-scale, high profile explosions of military institutions and
civilian establishments, suicide bombings and/or hijackings. But while the ASG proclaims itself as
part of the global jihad, its continual engagement in kidnap for ransom and extortion rackets
alongside small-scale bombings that are not typical of Islamic extremist groups in the Middle
East or even in Indonesia, sets it apart from those groups who proclaim to espouse jihad. For
instance, there has never been a case of suicide bombing committed by the ASG since its
inception53. Why is this so? Why the choice of kidnap for ransom and extortion over suicide
bombing missions, and why the decline of large-scale bombings in recent years?
Addressing these questions requires us to take into account the impact of multiple
institutions specific to the Philippine – especially Mindanao – context on the tactical choices of
the group: socio-economic conditions, existing governance institutions, cultural frames and
nuances, and religious ideology or – as what will be shown - the lack of such a deep-seated
philosophy underpinning their choice of tactics.
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From the authorʼs interviews. The closest that the ASG came to committing a suicide bombing was during the SuperFerry 14
bombing in 2004, the deadliest terrorist bombing in the country. Investigations led to the conclusion that an IED (in the form of a TV
set) was placed on board the lower level of the ship. The attack killed 116 people including 16 children. The bomber – a member of
another Islamic extremist group – allegedly planted the bomb for the Abu Sayyaf and disembarked before the ship sailed. My
interviews with intelligence officers and scholars who had personally spoken to the bomber revealed that the bomber was
supposed to be on a suicide mission, but that he had changed his mind before committing the attack. According to my interviewee:
“It was originally a suicide bombing mission. [But the] suicide bomber made a last minute decision stating that he was not yet ready
to be martyred.” (Authorʼs interview with a scholar, 27 December 2013.)
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, Mindanao is the most economically disenfranchised region
in the Philippines. The underdevelopment and the perpetual conflict have exacerbated the socioeconomic class divide (stemming from a history of feudalism and dominance of clans), leading to
extreme rates of poverty and a tremendous lack of opportunity especially for those who do not
belong to the class of traditional power-holders. In a 2009 survey54 by the Philippinesʼ Social
Weather Stations, 47% of respondents in Mindanao stated that the most important local problem
in the country was the economy, which included issues of unemployment and high prices of
commodities (with only 6% saying that crime – including kidnappings – was the most important a
problem). Grave socio-economic conditions thus drive those at the bottom of the totem pole – the
unrepresented and disenfranchised – to seek means of survival regardless of the ramifications of
these means; and for those who have seen the possible material benefits of ASG membership
through extortion and kidnap for ransom activities, and those who have directly benefited from
them, support for the ASG is the only viable alternative in an environment that does not present
them with legitimate opportunities for survival.
This demand for survival and other socio-economic grievances are consequently used
by the ASG as bait for involvement and support. Since the ASG is founded and heavily
dependent on kinship ties, its construction of a sense of family is based on a shared set of
grievances ranging from political and economic marginalization over time. The ASG thus
becomes the hero or ʻRobin Hoodʼ to those who cannot fend for themselves. As one of my
interviewees states when asked why he believes the ASG engages in kidnappings:
I: They are trapped in their situation. Just imagine Radullan Sahiron [the current
nominal leader of the ASG] as the Robin Hood of Patikul, Sulu. Heʼs their Robin Hood.
Whatever he acquires through KFR [kidnap for ransom], he maintains with and
distributes to the people. The peopleʼs interpretation of this is: “Hey, this is actually
beneficial. He distributes the wealth. Theyʼre just distributing the wealth. Getting the
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money from the wealthy people and distributing it. But they donʼt know that the
55
intention of Radullan Sahiron [is] not really humanitarian.

Exploiting socio-economic grievances and the sense of family that ASG has managed to create,
kidnap for ransom and extortion activities have thus become an underground “cottage industry”
in Mindanao (Ressa 2012) – a small, informal, loosely-organized industry pursued by ʻfamilyʼ
members using their own resources. The activities produce the much-needed financial resources
that are used by the group not to primarily pursue their stated ideological cause or gain resources
for their jihad – as what resource mobilization theorists might argue. Rather, the amassed
resources are there to satisfy the basic socio-economic difficulties of members and supporters
regardless of solid ideological ties to the ASG. The ransom money is used to purchase and
distribute guns and luxury goods (motorcycles, cars and the like),56 which ultimately become
material and symbolic sources of power for the group in Mindanao. In Moroland, the ASG has
thus become the “defender of the oppressed” (Ressa 2012: 63) and the cottage industry that
they have created has become the lifeblood of the Mindanao economy. For the immediate
members of the ASG and the tightly knit community supporting the group, carrying out these
tactics is their only option to challenge institutions of power that have long lorded over them.
The preponderance of kidnap for ransom and extortion tactics is aggravated by the fact
that governance institutions and the law enforcement system in Mindanao do not work. The
Philippines has a ʻno negotiation, no ransomʼ policy when it comes to dealing with terrorist
groups and addressing related kidnap for ransom cases. The central government draws a hard
line with this; yet it has been known that ransom money has indeed been paid time and time
again to the ASG through informal – i.e., non-governmental – channels57. This speaks to the
corruption that occurs, especially at the local government level in Mindanao. Elected officials
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Authorʼs interview with a scholar, 27 December 2013. Response translated from Tagalog.
Authorʼs interview with military intelligence officers in Manila, 2 January 2013.
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have ties to separatist groups including the ASG, with some of them known to have been former
members of these groups or to even have blood ties to the leaders or members of the ASG. As
disclosed by Maria Ressa (2012) in her recent book From bin Laden to Facebook: 10 Days, 10
Years, the negotiations between the ASG and ABS-CBN58 during the kidnapping of the latterʼs
media team were mediated on the ground by the Vice Governor of Jolo, Lady Ann Sahidulla –the
cousin of Albader Parad, one of the leaders responsible for the kidnapping – and the mayor of
the town of Indanan, Jun Isnaji chosen by the ASG because the group “knew where he live[d]”
(Ressa 2012:99). The ASG allegedly did not choose any politician from the central government
to represent them in the negotiations giving the reason that “politicians take a piece of the pot.”59
The unfortunate thing is, there appears to be some truth to such a statement. Testimonies from
former members of the ASG60 and other inside sources61 reveal that some government officials
as well as military personnel indeed have ties to the ASG and have moreover gained from the
ransom money and other perks of extortion activities.62 The kidnap for ransom cottage industry
thus permeates not just the ASG and its immediate support base, but also the government and
law enforcement institutions that are supposedly there to counter them. Without effective law
enforcement and without economic opportunities, this industry that provides a quick and
rewarding alternative to poverty and powerlessness will surely persist. As one of my interviewees
puts it:
I: This is a development issue… Weʼre like where the United States was in the 1920s. You had
robber barons, the mafia – and what happened was that the FBI kicked in and started putting
people away. You know, you had the Al Capones, you started running after them… Thatʼs the way
I feel where we are in the Philippines now. We need law enforcement to run after corruption. We
need to establish some sense of law and order in these lawless areas… So in Mindanao, in these
areas – Jolo, Basilan – these are seams of lawlessness… thereʼs no law and order… The very
people who are supposed to maintain the local government – the local police, the military – are

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58

ABS-CBN is the oldest and largest commercial television and broadcasting network in the Philippines, having around 30 bureaus
around the country.
59
From Maria Ressaʼs (2012) narration of negotiations with the ASG to release the ABS-CBN team.
60
From Maria Ressaʼs interview with “Mohammad,” a former leader of the ASG.
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See the work of Glenda Gloria, Gemma Bagayaua-Mendoza and Aries Rufo, “The Enemy Within: An Inside Story of Military
Corruption” as cited in Ressa (2012).
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This was also corroborated by the authorʼs interviews with intelligence officers, one scholar and one journalist.
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part of the corruption, or are part of the lack of a system. If you can fix those… I think thatʼs very
fundamental. If we can bring development into these areas, then I think terrorism, this problem
63
goes away.

One other question remains however: on the occasions when the ASG has chosen to
engage in bombings against military troops or IED attacks on civilians, why have suicide
missions not been used? Islamic extremists and jihadists in the Middle East largely use suicide
attacks as a movement tactic. In fact, 90% of recorded suicide bombings take place in Iraq,
Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka (Hassan 2009). This astronomical rate of suicide
bombings in one region leads us to question why such a stark difference exists between Islamic
extremist groups there and a group in the Philippines with an apparently similar cause. If the
ASG exists to establish a separate Muslim state and proclaims to do so through jihad qital, then
why have suicide missions – the ultimate act of sacrifice and martyrdom in pursuit of the
extremistsʼ pan-Islamic cause – not taken root among the ASG or among other Islamic
extremists in Mindanao, or even in Southeast Asia? Why have bombings, in general, been
inconsistently used as tactics by the ASG and further, why have kidnap for ransom activities
become more prominent?
The answer lies in understanding the role of ideology – and more significantly of
ideologues as leaders – in the strategic choices of the group. Maria Ressa posits that there have
been four “concrete cycles of evolution since the Abu Sayyafʼs founding” (2012: 86). She states:
“From 1991 until 1998 it was largely driven by ideological goals, partly because of the funding and
the behind-the-scenes manipulation of al-Qaeda. From 1998 till 2002, it turned to crime:
kidnappings for ransom and extortion operations, largely because of the loss of its ideological
moorings after the death of its founder. The third cycle ran from 2002 until 2008, when JI helped
reorient the group again towards terrorism. During that time, it carried out the regionʼs worst
maritime attack – the Superferry bombing in 2004. A year later, the Abu Sayyaf reached out from
its lairs in the south to the capital, Manila, and carried out near-simultaneous, coordinated attacks
including the Valentineʼs Day bus bombing. Finally, the fourth cycle began with the kidnapping of
Ces, Jimmy and Angel (the ABS-CBN team) in June 2008, when the Abu Sayyaf degenerated into
kidnapping for ransom again” (Ressa 2012: 86).
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When the ASG was founded and led by Abdurajak Janjalani, the ASG was directed by a
charismatic ideologue that was driven by full dedication to their cause; it was guided by a Muslim
ustadz 64 and warrior devoted to jihad qital (Ressa 2012). But upon his death and the
simultaneous breakdown of the groupʼs financial ties with the larger al-Qaeda network, the ASG
lost its ideological bearings (Ressa 2012). Factionalism ensued when Khadaffy Janjalani took the
helm, as his leadership qualities and ability to hold the group together using ideology proved no
match to that of his older brotherʼs skill65.
This leadership change took ASG down a different strategic path. With the ASG broken into
factions, led by men with different interests, and recruiting individuals who seemed to be merely
“drug addicts and criminals”66 not necessarily deeply indoctrinated, the ASGʼs activities ceased to
be the ideological and political statements envisioned by its founder. At that point in time,
kidnappings and extortion became rampant; and with the first two attempts of the group at largescale, international kidnap for ransom incidents in Sipadan and at the Dos Palmas resort literally
filling their coffers with millions of dollars in ransom, the perception that such activities could work
to bring them wealth and power began to take root. These activities were no longer simply a
means to an end, but became ends in themselves. Interestingly however, when the JI came back
into the picture in 2008, the ASG reverted to bombings and even upped the ante in terms of the
impact of the attacks. But again, the weakening of the groupʼs ideological and financial ties with
the larger international terrorist network upon the death of bin Laden brought them back into
crime and banditry.
The ʻcyclesʼ that Ressa describe clearly speak to the significance of religious ideology as
an institution that determines the purposefulness of the tactics of the group. With ideologues at
the helm, the violent acts the group chooses to perform have a “higher” purpose, i.e., they
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function as an instrument for the separatist cause; a material and symbolic weapon of the jihad
qital against the powerful social, political and cultural institutions in Mindanao. But when the ASG
experiences a dearth of ideologues providing direction, the resulting lack of indoctrination and
deep radicalization of the members leads to rifts within the organization and, consequently, a
series of merely criminal acts not sanctioned by the nominal head. These factions carelessly use
the jihad as justification for their actions, when in reality they pursue such acts of banditry to gain
power and influence in a land dominated by wealthy warlord clans and corrupt government
officials. As Podder (2012:510) aptly puts it, “the role of religion and ideology as legitimization
strategies… appears to be of diminishing significance in the Moro conflict.”
There are no Abu Sayyaf suicide bombers because a deep internalization of the groupʼs
ideological underpinnings is absent among its members, and there is no active effort from the
leadership at this point in time to achieve such a level of indoctrination or radicalization. The
current structure of the ASG makes religion inconsequential; 67 and without fundamentalist
religious ideology guiding its operations, we will continue to see a professed Islamic extremist
group like the ASG that is entrenched in a lawless, corrupt and impoverished society carry out
widespread – albeit disconnected – kidnapping and extortion rackets in Mindanao rather than alQaeda style terrorist attacks.
Indeed, the problem seems to be multi-institutional – developmental, cultural, historical,
social and political all at the same time. Using violence is a result of an almost unconscious
combination of context-specific conditions that are completely different from environments in
which other Islamic extremist groups (particularly in the Middle East) find themselves. Thus, I
argue that a purely militaristic approach that aims to completely eliminate them will simply be a
cause of perennial frustration; for as long as the power structures and dynamics in Mindanao –
and the rest of the Philippines for that matter – continue as they are, then the ASG will remain a
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challenge to the status quo. As long as the ASG continues to find itself entrenched in a power
struggle that is founded on guns, goons and gold, without any promising non-violent alternatives
for gaining dominance, then violence will continue to be its tactic of choice. And as long as its
members are not provided other opportunities to better themselves socio-economically, we will
unfortunately see more innocent captives tucked away in the jungles of Basilan, Jolo, and Sulu
with price tags on their heads.
NEXT STEPS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS CONTAINMENT?
When asked how they think the ʻASG problemʼ can be contained, there was a consensus
among all my interviewees: Bring development to Mindanao. There was an overwhelming belief
among these individuals who had either interviewed, studied, interacted with, immersed
themselves with, or even fought against members of the ASG for years, that the most effective
way to halt the ASGʼs brand of terrorism would be to provide them with socio-economic
prospects that can realistically give them an alternative to engaging in crime and terrorism. When
asked about the strategy of the military against the ASG, one military official I interviewed stated
that while they have an all-out war against the group the key to containing their violent actions
lies in addressing the peopleʼs welfare and providing socio-opportunities to the people in the
areas where the ASG operates:
R: You know, you go after the armed group. But you remove their influence, the real influence on
the people. So what we do is, we cater to the peopleʼs needs, itʼs just like winning their hearts and
minds. We win the people over [to] our side so that we can deny them [the ASG] support, deny
them space, [and] at the same time, confine them to isolated areas where we can launch military
operations minimizing collateral damage, human rights violations. And thatʼs exactly what the
people would like to have. Them not being disturbed while we go after the [ASG] because this is
an intelligence-driven, selective operation against a small group…
But then, we had this strategy in 2005 against the Abu Sayyaf – and this is now the current
68
strategy that we have – Bayanihan . It is giving more importance to the welfare of the people,
getting their support. Because without peopleʼs support or wherever the people will side, [the
ASG] will win. So we have to win people [over to] our side by providing them their basic
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another town or another location in the village, the entire community would come together to literally lift and move the nipa hut of
that family to the familyʼs destination.
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needs…For example – itʼs between an Abu Sayyaf [member] and myself [a Philippine soldier]. I
provide you with schools, roads, potable water, and everything, medical assistance. I donʼt think
you, as a civilian, would choose the Abu Sayyaf who come to you and extort money from you for
these resources. So itʼs isolating the enemy.
I: So despite this strategy, why do you think there are still those who choose to join the ASG?
R: Well, the world is not perfect... So people are still thinking that they want easy money; they can
go with them [the ASG]. And they think that they can get away with it.

Indeed, providing socio-economic opportunities to the potential recruits of the ASG appears to
be the logical and most direct way of containing the ʻASG problem.ʼ After all, knowing that the
original Islamic separatist cause of the group and its foundational ideology are not deeply
planted in the hearts and minds of most of its current active members – and that financial gain
which provides material and symbolic power is the primary incentive of the group to engage in
violence today – the evidence supports the assertion that the problem can be addressed, and
perhaps even contained, through socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the response of
the military official above points simultaneously to the complex and multi-faceted nature of the
problem – a characteristic that necessitates an equally multi-institutional response. The fact that
people who mull over joining a life of banditry with ASG believe that the group will be able to get
them “easy money” and be able to “get away with it” clearly suggests that without strong law
enforcement and effective local governance, all efforts to provide economic development and
welfare opportunities will be in vain. If the culture of warlordism and corruption remains
unchecked, containment strategies through a development lens will prove inadequate.
Quelling the violence and terrorism perpetrated by the ASG requires more than a
militaristic approach. It requires an understanding of the multi-layered context within which the
group operates in Mindanao as well as the interplay of the multiple institutions of power against
which they struggle. Only with this understanding can we begin to take the laborious steps
toward any resolution to a centuries-old crisis in the southern Philippines.
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CHAPTER 8.
CONCLUSION
We typically view terrorism as a combination of senseless and unlawful acts of great
proportions. Since terrorist acts are committed by individuals who are armed and who belong to
a supposedly massive web of conspirators, the perpetrators of these acts – terrorist groups –
are commonly viewed (at least in the literature and in government/policy reports), as tightly knit
militaristic organizations that belong to extensive networks comprised of rogue individuals
(Guanratna 2002). This leads to the perception that formal, institutional and militaristic
responses are apropos, and necessarily the most effective. Yet, it is important to note that as
sociological concepts, violence and terrorism (deviant behavior in general) are social
constructions (Ben-Yehuda 1993; Turk 2002). Terrorism and political violence are thus
interpretations of events and their presumed causes. This is perhaps why there remains no
consensus about what terrorism precisely means. As Turk (2004: 273) posits, the “construction
and selective application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political
conflicts.” The struggle involves ideological warfare: Casting the ʻenemyʼ or the ʻotherʼ as an
“evildoer” to win support for oneʼs cause or that of the group to which he or she belongs (Turk
2004).
This then brings us back to the sociological questions posed in the first part of this
paper. In light of the inability of current counterterrorism strategies in the Philippines to
sufficiently quell the terrorist threat from the ASG, the country might benefit from transforming
the way it views the group in relation to how it devises means of dealing with them. The analysis
presented here based on a social movement framework – particularly the multi-institutional
politics approach to social movements – has ushered us into a deeper understanding of the
multi-layered conditions surrounding and shaping the dynamics and tactical choices of the ASG
over time.
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This study suggests that there are multiple institutions that simultaneously work to shape
the strategic decision(s) of the group to use violence and terrorism as a tactic. The ASG feel that
violence is the appropriate – and lone – tactical option for them to acquire material and symbolic
power. This belief is based on 1) the obligation to continue the perennial struggle of violent
separatism in Mindanao; 2) the inevitability of continuing this fight by adapting to the power
dynamics in Mindanao to ensure success; and 3) the lack of alternatives to violence as means to
climb out of their powerlessness, impoverishment and marginalization. The result of these factors
is a mélange of context-specific conditions that produce the particular tactics the ASG has used
over time. Rather than pure ideology or political opportunities determining the course and
dynamics of this social movement organization, it is the lethal combination of the culture of
warlordism, history of Muslim oppression, weak governance and law enforcement, and the lack
of economic opportunities in Mindanao that define how the ASG plays the power game.
Moreover, the specific set of tactics currently used by the ASG (kidnap for ransom,
extortion, small-scale bombings instead of suicide bombings or large-scale attacks) points to the
superficial and misguided indoctrination of Islamic fundamentalism among its members and
supporters. Since ideology is no longer the principal driving force of the ASG, the choice of
tactics depends on the type of leader calling the shots and the level of ideological indoctrination
espoused by this leader at a particular point in time. This, coupled with the need of the members
of the group to attain socio-economic survival and gain material and symbolic power, spells the
tactical difference. The operations of the ASG have been patently influenced by the power
dynamics that operate through and around a multitude of institutions in Mindanao, rather than by
its political struggle against the Philippine state alone.
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Next Questions
While this study identifies and thoroughly examines the multiple institutions that have shaped
and continue to shape the tactics of the ASG, it simultaneously raises other questions that
require further research. One of these revolves around the measures that could effectively
contain groups like the ASG. Assuming that non-militaristic containment measures do not
successfully quell the ʻASG problem,ʼ how can socio-economic development strategies – the
most prevalent ʻsolutionʼ suggested both by scholars of the Mindanao problem and those
interviewed in this study – be tailored to address the multi-layered nature of the crisis in
Mindanao? In what ways can such a containment strategy adapt to the power structures shaped
by the cultural, religious and social institutions that dominate the Southern Philippines? It has
been argued here that a multi-institutional strategy is needed to contain violent acts of the ASG.
Yet, given the overwhelming clamor for a socio-economic approach to the problem, it would
indeed benefit the ASG counter-movement to systematically and empirically consider how such
a strategy can be applied, and what conditions will allow it to work in the Mindanao context. A
comparative study looking at non-militaristic containment strategies against anti-state, insurgent
or extremist movements would perhaps contribute to examining this question.
Another interesting question that would be crucial to further understanding the ASG and
other Islamic extremist groups is one that touches on the phenomenon of radicalization or
indoctrination vis-à-vis the groupʼs network and kinship structure. Ressa (2012) argues for the
need to rigorously study the social networks through which the “jihadi virus” has spread
throughout Southeast Asia, and particularly look at how it is spreading in the virtual world i.e.,
through online social media. Further research on online social networks would indeed be
essential to get a macro picture of the recruitment processes of groups like the ASG. But how
does the network function at the micro level? How does ideological radicalization occur (or not
occur) in the inner circles of the network, especially when members are tied by blood and
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marriage? Is a terrorist or extremist organization that depends on kinship to establish and
maintain loyalty stronger than one that is comprised of ʻbrothers and sisters in the faithʼ? Such a
future project would be a fascinating exploration into how much kinship, community and family
indeed influence terrorist networks compared to the prevailing explanation of deep ideological
ties.
Ultimately, the analysis here suggests that in light of the unyielding and dynamic threat
from terrorist networks, sociologists must continue exploring the links between the emergence
and perpetuation of terrorism as employed by groups and the various institutions that shape the
power structures that such groups contend with. As Austin Turk (2004) argues, it is vital to
identify and understand what comprise the settings in which people come to make the choice to
engage in terrorism as an option in their struggles.
It is undeniable that terrorism and political violence are tactics (Tilly 2004), and the
movements that employ them seek to make claims that challenge existing institutions of power.
Given the nascent state of scholarship on terrorism within the ambit of social movements
theories, the time is thus ripe for fresh, vigorous, and continuous application of an alternative
multi-institutional approach to examine terrorist movements. The duty is even more relevant and
necessary, as we seek to provide countries like the Philippines that face perennial insecurity
from such groups with a better image of the “enemy.” This study hopes that it has contributed to
that task so that ultimately, the space for movement tactics that hurt and take away innocent
lives will no longer exist.
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